The Listener in the Wire: How Ohio Put a Million Dollars Behind AI Call Monitoring, a County Logged 88 Confessions in a Quarter, and the FCC Voted to Bill Inmates for Their Own Surveillance

The Listener in the Wire: How Ohio Put a Million Dollars Behind AI Call Monitoring, a County Logged 88 Confessions in a Quarter, and the FCC Voted to Bill Inmates for Their Own Surveillance

A state budget line, a sheriff’s quarterly numbers, and a federal rate change are quietly building the largest AI surveillance system aimed at incarcerated Americans — with the people being watched paying part of the bill.


The Policy Moment

Three developments, barely noticed outside criminal justice circles, converged in 2025 and 2026 to make AI monitoring of prison phone calls one of the fastest-moving AI deployments in American law enforcement. First, the FCC reversed a 2024 reform and voted to let telecom companies pass the cost of recording, transcribing, and AI-analyzing calls back onto incarcerated people and their families, effective April 6, 2026. Second, Securus Technologies — the country’s largest prison telecom — disclosed it trained a large language model on seven years of Texas prison calls and is now piloting it to predict crimes before they happen. Third, states are appropriating public money to scale the technology: Ohio’s recently passed state budget included $1 million for the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to buy software that can “transcribe and analyze all inmate phone calls.” None of these moves required new legislation explicitly authorizing AI surveillance of prisons. That is precisely why they matter: the deployment is running ahead of any dedicated policy framework.


What Ohio Did

Ohio’s state budget provided $1 million for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to purchase software able to “transcribe and analyze all inmate phone calls,” with the resulting data made accessible to law enforcement agencies across the state to support criminal investigations. The program is funded as a pilot through 2026, and the rollout begins at Ross Correctional Institution in Chillicothe — the prison where, prosecutors say, an incarcerated man murdered a corrections officer on Christmas Day 2024, amid guard-union reports of understaffing and a near-tripling of use-of-force incidents between 2013 and 2023. [1]

Two details in the Ohio story illustrate how AI policy actually gets made in this space — not through a standalone statute, but through budget riders and lobbying. The vendor whose software won the funding, Texas-based LeoTech, hired three lobbyists from two law firms to press its case to House lawmakers, and the ODRC director personally advocated for the appropriation. The supporting lawmakers’ logic is straightforward: state policy already allowed employees and contractors to monitor and record any call at random or “for cause,” but manual review was capped by staffing. AI simply removes the staffing constraint. As House Finance Chairman Brian Stewart put it, the appeal was “the potential to do what we’re already doing, in a more efficient way with less man hours and taxpayer expense.” [1]

That logic is worth pausing on, because it is the core argument driving AI adoption across law enforcement. If the underlying power to surveil already exists, the argument runs, then automating it is merely an efficiency upgrade. But efficiency in surveillance is not neutral. The same dollar of monitoring budget that previously covered a sample of calls now covers all of them — which changes the character of the power, not just its speed. Legal scholars and advocates argue that this quantitative leap produces a qualitatively different system, what one Columbia Law lecturer described as a “permeating surveillance system” that sweeps in law-abiding people on the outside of the prison walls too. [1]


What Cuyahoga County Says the Technology Does

The clearest public window into how these systems perform in practice comes from Cuyahoga County, which has run the LeoTech Verus system on its Cleveland jail calls for the past year. County officials presented the case for a $2.7 million, two-year contract extension to council in September 2026, and their numbers are the first sustained body of evidence on an AI call-monitoring deployment in a major American jail. [2]

  • 88 confessions captured in one quarter. In the second quarter of 2026 alone, the AI-assisted monitoring system captured 88 confessions, according to the sheriff department’s chief deputy. The system flags calls by keyword, alerting staff in real time to potential criminal activity or self-harm. The confessions figure is the headline metric officials cite because it is the most directly verifiable outcome: an admission in a recorded call is evidence that can be checked against a case file, which is why it anchors the county’s pitch for continuing the contract. [2]
  • 23 homicides solved, 30 suicides prevented. Chief Deputy Aaron Reese told council the system has helped solve 23 homicides and prevent 30 suicides, and that the jail has recorded no suicide or overdose death since adoption. These numbers are self-reported by the department, not independently audited, but they represent the strongest empirical claim yet that AI monitoring saves lives behind bars. [2]
  • The privilege firewall is procedural, not technical. Attorney-client calls are protected not by the AI but by registration: lawyers sign up with jail officials and receive instructions on how to “safeguard” the calls, and the county says such calls are not recorded. Given that the same underlying provider, Securus, has paid settlements in other states for recording privileged calls, the county’s safeguard depends entirely on process discipline holding up under scale. [2]

The Cuyahoga numbers show why this technology is politically durable: it produces countable successes with sympathetic victims (homicide victims, would-be suicides) and low visibility for its costs. The 88 confessions are named and counted; the calls never made because a family could no longer afford the per-minute rate are not. That asymmetry — measurable benefits, invisible costs — is the structural bias any regulatory response has to overcome.


The Securus Model: Training AI on Prison Calls to Predict Crime

The most consequential development is the shift from keyword flagging to predictive analysis. MIT Technology Review reported that Securus Technologies began building AI tools in 2023, using its massive database of recorded calls to train models to detect criminal activity — including one model built on seven years of calls made by inmates in the Texas prison system, with state- and county-specific models in development. Over the year preceding the report, Securus had been piloting the tools to monitor inmate conversations in real time, analyzing phone and video calls, texts, and emails and flagging sections for human agents to review. [3]

Securus president Kevin Elder described the capability in explicitly predictive terms: “We can point that large language model at an entire treasure trove [of data], to detect and understand when crimes are being thought about or contemplated, so that you’re catching it much earlier in the cycle.” The company said its monitoring has helped disrupt human trafficking and gang activity organized from within prisons, and to identify staff bringing in contraband — though it did not provide MIT Technology Review with any cases specifically uncovered by the new AI models. [3]

Two features distinguish this from ordinary call monitoring, and both cut in the company’s favor on capability and against it on governance.

  • The training data is the calls themselves. The models are built from years of recorded conversations between incarcerated people and their families. People are told calls are recorded, but there is no meaningful consent to having their voices used as training data. Bianca Tylek of the prison rights group Worth Rises called it “coercive consent; there’s literally no other way you can communicate with your family” — and noted that in most states, “not only are you not compensating them for the use of their data, but you’re actually charging them while collecting their data.” The core logic of the objection: consent cannot be free when the alternative to agreeing is isolation. [3]
  • The target has moved from crimes committed to crimes contemplated. Keyword systems surface evidence of offenses that have occurred; a model tuned to detect “when crimes are being thought about or contemplated” is aimed at intent. That is the move from surveillance to prediction — the same conceptual step that has drawn scrutiny in every other domain where AI has entered criminal justice, from facial recognition to risk assessment. [3]

Securus has a documented history of capturing privileged conversations. Leaked recording databases showed the company improperly recorded thousands of calls between inmates and their attorneys; it settled a California class action for $880,000 over unlawfully recorded public-defender calls, and it and CoreCivic paid $5.3 million to settle two Kansas suits from some 500 detainees whose attorney calls were recorded. The New York Department of Investigation found Securus inadvertently recorded about 324 privileged calls in a single system in roughly a year — a small subset of about 700,000 calls analyzed, but one that the ACLU’s National Prison Project says shows how few limits courts have placed on this surveillance power. “I think this is one of many situations where the technology is way far ahead of the law,” said Corene Kendrick, the project’s deputy director. [3]


The FCC Reversal: Making Inmates Fund the Surveillance

The FCC’s October 28, 2025 order (FCC 25-75) is the policy hinge of the whole story, and it turned on a specific statutory instruction. The Martha Wright-Reed Act of 2022 directed the Commission to consider “costs associated with any safety and security measures necessary to provide” communications services to incarcerated people. In 2024, a unanimous Commission read that mandate narrowly, capping rates and forbidding telecoms from passing recording and security costs to inmates — and required facilities to fund monitoring from their own budgets. The 2025 order reversed course on the central question of who pays. [4]

Under the new rules effective April 6, 2026, per-minute caps rose across every facility tier — a prison call that would have cost 6 cents per minute under the 2024 reform now caps at 11 cents, and video call caps run to 25 cents per minute in prisons — and providers may add a separate “rate additive” on top. More consequentially, the FCC expanded the cost categories providers may recover from incarcerated users from two to seven, adding Law Enforcement Support Services, Communication Recording Services, Communication Monitoring Services, Voice Biometric Services, and Other Safety and Security Measures. The Communications Recording Services category explicitly includes “storing recorded communications, transcribing such recordings, and converting recordings into digital formats to support investigation and litigation activities” — and the Communications Monitoring Services category is, per the order’s own accounting, now predominantly AI. [4]

Commissioner Anna Gomez dissented, and her statement is the sharpest available framing of the governance stakes:

“Law enforcement,” she wrote, “should foot the bill for unrelated security and safety costs, not the families of incarcerated people.” [5]

Gomez’s dissent identified the evidentiary core of the dispute: by the FCC’s own record, 76% of prison systems already complied with the 2024 caps, with only Florida, Kentucky, and Oklahoma above even the new interim caps — meaning most facilities could and did provide service within the lower rates. The evidence of crisis the order relied on, she argued, amounted to a single Arkansas sheriff’s office that ended phone service, a handful of small jails where providers stopped service, and speculative statements from sheriff associations. The 2024 data collection found security costs were not “used and useful” to providing communications; the 2025 order reversed that finding based on the providers’ own submissions — the same providers, Gomez noted, whose data quality the order elsewhere described as insufficient. “The FCC today decides to reward bad behavior,” she wrote. [5]

The core logic of the dissent is a principle that extends well beyond prison phones: when a regulated monopoly funds an activity through user fees, the fee-payers have no exit, and cost-shifting is indistinguishable from a tax levied by private companies. Prison telecom is a monopoly by design — the facility picks the provider, and incarcerated people cannot switch. Putting AI monitoring costs on the rate base therefore means the people under surveillance pay for the instruments surveilling them. [4] [5]


Why It Matters Beyond Prisons

The prison call story is a compact case study in how AI becomes infrastructure without ever being voted on as AI policy. Consider the pattern:

  • Power first, automation second. Every state already permitted call monitoring; AI vendors simply removed the human-review bottleneck. The same pattern governs most AI in criminal justice — the legal authority pre-exists, and the algorithm changes only the scale. This is why dedicated AI statutes keep arriving after the deployment, not before it. [1]
  • Budget lines are AI policy. Ohio’s $1 million appropriation, Cuyahoga’s $2.7 million contract, and the FCC’s rate-additive all function as AI authorizations without any of them being an AI law. Legislatures and agencies are already making AI policy every budget cycle; they are just not calling it that. [1] [2] [4]
  • The surveillance extends beyond the surveilled. Every monitored call has two parties, and the person outside the prison walls has not been convicted of anything — often has not been charged with anything. Advocates note the systems produce disproportionate false-positive flags on Black and minority incarcerated callers and struggle with non-Eurocentric accents, extending surveillance’s reach into what one advocate called “already over-policed communities of color.” [1]
  • Self-reported efficacy data is the accountability system. Cuyahoga’s 88 confessions and 30 prevented suicides come from the department pitching its own contract extension. No independent audit of the technology’s accuracy, false-positive rate, or disparate impact is required anywhere in the country before deployment. Where such scrutiny has occurred in adjacent domains — facial recognition, risk assessment — it has generally found error rates concentrated on the same populations. [2]

Where Policy Goes From Here

Several concrete governance moves are visible in the current landscape, each addressing a different layer of the problem:

  • Privilege protection by technical requirement, not policy. The repeated attorney-call recording failures at Securus and its peers suggest that registration-and-safeguard procedures are not robust at scale. Requiring technical privilege filtering — with vendor liability for privileged captures — would move the protection from administrative discipline to engineering. [1] [3]
  • Data-use limits on training. The coercive-consent problem is specific to AI: recording is disclosed, but model training is not. A notice-and-consent requirement for training use, or a prohibition on training commercial models on privileged or family communications, would address the gap directly. [3]
  • Independent efficacy audit before scale. Cuyahoga’s numbers deserve the same scrutiny any evidence-generating technology gets in court: validated accuracy, measured false-positive rates, and disparate-impact testing, audited by parties who do not hold the contract. The FCC’s 2025 order ordered another mandatory data collection on rates; nothing comparable exists for the monitoring technology itself. [4]
  • Who pays. The Gomez dissent articulates the cleanest principle on offer: if AI monitoring is a law enforcement tool, law enforcement budgets should fund it. The FCC’s further rulemaking on permanent caps is the open venue for revisiting that choice — the Commission is still seeking comment on the new rules before final effect. [5]

The prison phone system is where three pressure points of AI policy intersect: monopoly infrastructure, an unexitable user population, and a security rationale that makes every incremental expansion politically easy. What happens in this niche is worth watching for a simpler reason: it is the most complete working model of AI surveillance funded by the people it watches.


References

[1] Signal Ohio — [SECONDARY] “Ohio prisons to use AI to listen in on ‘all inmate’ calls.” 2025.

[2] Ideastream Public Media — [SECONDARY] Richmond, Matthew. “Cuyahoga County considers AI contract to monitor jail phone calls.” September 16, 2026.

[3] MIT Technology Review — [SECONDARY] “An AI model trained on prison phone calls now looks for planned crimes in those calls.” December 1, 2025.

[4] Federal Communications Commission — [PRIMARY] “Incarcerated People’s Communications Services (formerly Inmate Calling Services).” Updated January 14, 2026.

[5] FCC — [PRIMARY] Gomez, Anna M. “Statement of Commissioner Anna M. Gomez, Re: Incarcerated People’s Communications Services.” October 28, 2025.


AI automated and generated content. Human reviewed.

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