The Governance Gap: How Two Police Report Laws, Fifteen Facial Recognition Statutes, and a Federal Preemption Threat Are Reshaping AI in Criminal Justice
State legislatures are building the first guardrails around police AI — from California’s audit-trail mandate to Virginia’s new warrant requirement — while scholars warn that ad hoc rules are no substitute for dedicated governance institutions.
The Speed Problem
Artificial intelligence is no longer a distant or speculative technology in the criminal justice system. It is becoming part of its everyday machinery. Police departments use algorithmic tools to analyze digital evidence, look for patterns in crime data, and draft police reports. Prosecutors rely on AI software to manage discovery and support charging decisions. Courts encounter algorithmic risk assessments and large language models that promise to summarize records, draft documents, and assist with legal analysis[1]. Across the system, AI is being woven into decisions that affect liberty itself.
What is changing is the speed, scope, and complexity of those tools. As police departments accumulate growing volumes of digital evidence — from body camera footage and surveillance video to jail calls, social media records, and case files — AI is increasingly being used to sort, search, and analyze that information. Cris Moore, a computer scientist and professor at the Santa Fe Institute, told Stateline that “the speed at which technologically created evidence has been adopted, and the aggression with which it’s being pushed makes it hard for the legal community to keep up”[2].
The companies offering AI-powered tools for law enforcement include Axon, Motorola Solutions, TRULEO, Flock Safety, Clearview AI, and Mark43, whose ReportAI and BriefAI products help officers draft reports from dispatch records and body camera footage. Mark43’s senior vice president of product, Wendy Gilbert, framed the value proposition: “Our core mission is to help responders spend less time on administrative work, so that they can spend more time serving in their communities”[2]. Yet the same efficiency gains that make these tools attractive to under-resourced agencies also make them harder to vet. A May 2026 RAND report produced for the Council on Criminal Justice’s Task Force on AI found that AI applications are “often discussed and governed as if they were a single category of technology,” despite wide variation in their technical sophistication, intended use, and influence on human judgment[3].
Two States, Two Models: California and Utah Write the First Rules for AI Police Reports
As of July 2026, only two states have enacted laws specifically governing AI-assisted police report writing. Both require disclosure and officer certification, but they differ in how deeply they reach into the audit trail — and that difference reveals two philosophies about what oversight is for.
California SB 524 — The Comprehensive Model
Enacted and effective January 1, 2026, California’s SB 524 is the most comprehensive law of its kind in the country. When a report is generated wholly or partly by AI, the agency’s policy must ensure[4]:
- Disclosure of the AI program used — the specific system that generated or assisted the report must be identified, so that downstream actors (prosecutors, defense counsel, judges) know what they are dealing with.
- Officer certification of accuracy — the officer must affirm that they reviewed the report for accuracy, establishing that the final report is the officer’s statement, not the machine’s.
- Retention of the original AI-generated draft — agencies must keep the first AI-generated draft for as long as the final report is kept, preserving a paper trail that can reveal what the AI said before a human edited it.
- An audit trail tied to source footage or audio — the system must link outputs back to the body camera or dispatch audio they were generated from, so that claims in the report can be checked against raw evidence.
- A prohibition on vendors reselling agency data — police data collected through AI report-writing cannot be monetized or repurposed by the vendor.
The core logic here is evidentiary integrity. Police reports play a critical role in investigations and court proceedings, and errors introduced by AI systems — inaccuracies, omissions, or misinterpretations of context — could influence how evidence is understood by investigators, prosecutors, and judges if they go undetected. By mandating draft retention and source-linking, California ensures that the gap between what the machine produced and what the officer signed off on is always reconstructable. That is the difference between a report that says “an AI helped” and one that can be forensically examined.
Utah SB 180 — The First-Mover Model
Utah was the first state to act, with SB 180 effective May 7, 2025. It requires a written generative-AI policy, a disclaimer on any AI-assisted report, and officer certification of accuracy[4]. Utah does not require retaining the original AI draft — a meaningful gap compared to California, because without the draft there is no way to see what the AI initially produced or whether the officer’s edits changed substantive content or merely corrected formatting. The Utah model trusts the certification; the California model trusts but verifies.
The Bills That Did Not Make It
Several other states tried and failed. New York’s S10425 / A9253-A was the most ambitious bill — its “Covered AI” definition expressly included generative report-writing AI, with a public inventory, disclosure, first-draft retention, and both Attorney General and private enforcement — but it died when the Legislature adjourned sine die on June 5, 2026. Reintroduction is expected in 2027[4]. Minnesota’s SF 4575 / HF 4536, which would have prohibited generative AI in official records outright, remains pending. Virginia’s HB 1294 was carried over to 2027. Nevada’s SB 199, a proposed ban, failed in 2025[4].
In the absence of statutes, some prosecutors have stepped in. Connecticut’s Chief State’s Attorney imposed a statewide moratorium on using AI to draft or narrate criminal reports in April 2026. King County, Washington’s Prosecuting Attorney’s Office will not accept AI-assisted report narratives, per a September 2024 memo[4]. These non-statutory restrictions show that the gap between legislative action and frontline practice is being filled — unevenly — by prosecutors who answer to no legislature.
The Facial Recognition Frontier: 15 States and a Virginia Tightening
Facial recognition is the most regulated AI application in law enforcement, but the regulatory landscape is fractured across at least four distinct approaches. Roughly 15 states have enacted limits as of July 2026, and the strategies cluster into recognizable patterns[4]:
- Warrant or court-order requirements (Washington, Montana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Utah, and as of July 1, 2026, Virginia) — facial recognition data can only be accessed through a judicial warrant, treating it like a search under the Fourth Amendment rather than an investigative convenience.
- “Not the sole basis for arrest” safeguards (Alabama, Maryland, Montana, Washington) — a face match alone cannot justify an arrest; it must be corroborated by independent evidence. This directly addresses documented wrongful arrests, primarily of Black individuals, caused by erroneous facial recognition identifications[5].
- Near-total moratoria (Maine, with the broadest government ban and narrow carve-outs; Vermont, with only a child-exploitation exception) — these states have decided the risks of police facial recognition outweigh the benefits entirely.
- Body-camera-only prohibitions (Minnesota, Oregon, New Hampshire) — barring facial-recognition analysis of body-cam footage specifically, preventing the tool that officers wear every shift from becoming a continuous biometric surveillance system.
Virginia’s July 1 Tightening
Virginia’s evolution is instructive because it shows how a state can move from permissive to restrictive within a single legislative cycle. The state’s prior law, still effective until July 1, 2026, allowed local law enforcement to use facial recognition for a long list of “authorized uses” — from identifying crime victims to vetting undercover officers — and required NIST evaluation for accuracy and demographic performance[6]. It was a permissive-but-regulated model.
The new version, effective July 1, 2026, takes a fundamentally different approach. It provides that “no local law-enforcement agency shall purchase or deploy facial recognition technology unless such purchase or deployment of facial recognition technology is expressly authorized by statute”[6]. A statute that does not refer to facial recognition technology cannot be construed to provide that authorization. The law further requires that any facial recognition technology be “maintained under the exclusive control of such local law-enforcement agency” and that any data be “kept confidential, not be disseminated or resold, and be accessible only by a search warrant”[6].
The logic is a default-deny posture: unless a locality’s governing body has specifically voted to authorize facial recognition with warrant-level data protections, the technology cannot be used. This flips the burden from “allowed unless prohibited” to “prohibited unless expressly authorized” — a structural choice that makes it much harder for agencies to adopt the technology quietly through procurement.
Where Courts Step In
In states without statutes, courts have begun filling the gap. In New Jersey, the case State v. Arteaga (2023) requires defendants be notified when facial recognition was used in their case. In Michigan, a settlement barred the Detroit Police Department from arresting on a face match alone[4]. These judicial interventions matter because they create binding rules in individual jurisdictions without legislative action — but they also produce a patchwork where your rights depend on your zip code.
The Preemption Shadow: Can the Federal Government Stop States?
While states build these guardrails, a federal executive order threatens to chill the entire enterprise. In December 2025, the White House released a presidential action titled “Eliminating State Law Obstruction of National Artificial Intelligence Policy,” designed to intimidate state AI laws through legally dubious means[5].
The order deploys the Department of Justice to sue states, threatens to strip federal funding from states with laws deemed “onerous,” directs the Federal Trade Commission to declare state algorithmic discrimination laws preempted, and instructs the Federal Communications Commission to create reporting standards that would nullify state transparency requirements[5]. Crucially, the order itself exempts from its scope any laws regulating “state government procurement and use of AI” — meaning states retain clear authority to regulate their own law enforcement and criminal justice agencies’ use of AI[5].
Brookings scholars Chiraag Bains, Alex Chohlas-Wood, and Katie Kinsey argue in an April 2026 analysis that the administration’s main legal theory — that state AI laws violate the dormant commerce clause — is weak, because most state AI laws apply equally to in-state and out-of-state developers. They also note that the president “cannot by executive fiat attach new policy conditions to BEAD” funding and that nothing in the FCC’s statutory authority authorizes it to regulate AI generally, let alone preempt state AI laws[5]. Their bottom line: “States should not be deterred”[5].
Utah’s Republican Governor Spencer Cox has separately argued that his state should be allowed to regulate AI to avoid harms, noting that “the Supreme Court is going to back me up on that”[5]. The preemption fight is not partisan in the traditional sense — it pits a federal deregulatory agenda against state authority that both red and blue states have been exercising.
Beyond Statutes: The Case for a Dedicated Governance Entity
Even where states have acted, the rules are narrow and reactive. California regulates AI in police reports. Virginia regulates facial recognition. But no state has built a governance institution capable of evaluating the full range of AI tools flowing into criminal justice — from predictive policing models to generative AI in prosecutorial charging decisions to algorithmic risk assessments at sentencing.
A March 2026 Stanford Law School policy paper, produced in partnership with the Council on Criminal Justice’s Task Force on AI, argues that this is the central problem. The paper’s core finding is that “artificial intelligence capabilities and products are being developed and deployed in criminal justice without sufficient understanding of how they work, attention to their failure risks, or analysis of how they implicate constitutional and other values”[1]. Judges, prosecutors, police officers, probation officers, and policymakers are adopting complex technologies without the technical background needed to assess their design, limitations, or possible failures. Vendors market these systems directly to practitioners, most of whom lack both the time and expertise to conduct meaningful independent evaluation[1].
The Stanford team’s recommendation is structural: we need specialized AI governance entities for the criminal justice system. Such an entity — housed within the federal government, a consortium of states, or a public-interest institution with formal authority and stable funding — could serve as a hub of technical, legal, and ethical expertise. It could independently evaluate high-impact AI tools, publish accessible assessments, maintain up-to-date guidance on acceptable uses and known risks, develop standardized benchmarks and testing protocols, coordinate incident reporting and auditing, and provide technical assistance to agencies that cannot afford their own AI review teams[1].
The paper draws an analogy to sentencing commissions, which it identifies as the closest existing model. Sentencing commissions balance expertise, stability, transparency, and iterative governance. They pair pluralistic decision-making bodies with standing research staff, translating technical analysis into durable standards that shape practice over time, even without broad enforcement authority. The Stanford team concludes that “the most effective approach to AI governance in criminal justice may draw selectively from multiple models rather than replicating any single one wholesale”[1].
The underlying principle is that good guidelines and standards are necessary but not sufficient. The CCJ Task Force is doing vital work in articulating governing principles, procurement standards, and case studies. The question is how to deploy and implement that guidance — how to build durable structures that can translate expert recommendations into concrete policies and support practitioners in applying them case by case, tool by tool[1]. Without that institutional capacity, standards on paper become like the Utah draft-retention gap: well-intentioned rules that cannot be enforced or even checked.
The Agentic Policing Horizon
The most forward-looking concern raised by experts is the possible advent of what Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, a law professor at George Washington University and author of “Your Data Will Be Used Against You: Policing in the Age of Self-Surveillance,” calls “agentic policing.” Future technologies could integrate body-camera footage, camera networks, and other data sources into a single system capable of generating investigative leads, identifying potential suspects, or suggesting connections between cases[2].
Ferguson’s concern is not that AI will replace human judgment but that it will invert the investigative process. “All that data is going to be dumped into an AI model, and they’re going to query it to say who’s the most likely suspect,” he told Stateline. “The AI is going to be running the agentic analysis of it and come up with the answer, and then police and prosecutors have to kind of work backwards to see if it’s accurate”[2]. This flips the traditional investigative process — which starts with evidence and builds toward a conclusion — into one that starts with a conclusion and works backward to justify it. Ferguson warns: “We’ve never started with an answer and made people work backwards. There are very real constitutional, statutory and practical risks with this new model of agentic policing”[2].
The RAND taxonomy for the CCJ Task Force reinforces this concern with a structural finding: risks for complex AI systems are “concentrated in high-stakes criminal justice functions” including pretrial, sentencing, and enforcement decisions, and AI applications relying on past criminal justice data “tend to systematically reproduce racial and socioeconomic disparities”[3]. The taxonomy recommends that agencies “prioritize safeguards over expansion in high-risk areas” and “keep humans in charge of decisions about liberty”[3].
Conclusion: The Patchwork Problem
The current moment is defined by a paradox. AI adoption in criminal justice is accelerating — Mark43 alone reports that dozens of agencies are using, testing, or evaluating its AI features, and Hawaii’s Maui County Council approved a $1.7 million expansion of AI-supported policing tools in June 2026[2] — but the governance infrastructure is being built state by state, statute by statute, with no national framework and no consistent standard for what “responsible AI in criminal justice” means in practice.
California’s SB 524 sets the high-water mark for police report oversight. Virginia’s July 1 tightening shows that states can move from permissive to restrictive when the evidence warrants. The CCJ Task Force and Stanford have built the intellectual architecture for a governance entity that could evaluate tools, publish assessments, and provide technical assistance. But none of these pieces, by itself, closes the gap. As the Stanford paper puts it: “The tools are here. The stakes are clear. What is missing is the governance capacity to match them. It is time to build it”[1].
Until that capacity exists, the rules that govern AI in criminal justice will continue to be written in the space between a vendor’s marketing pitch and a legislature’s next session — and the people whose liberty is at stake will have to hope their state was one of the ones that showed up.
References
[1] Stanford Law School — “AI in Criminal Justice: Why Governance Matters and How to Make It Work” by Jonathan Wroblewski (March 27, 2026) — [SECONDARY]
[2] Stateline — “Police use of artificial intelligence grows as rules lag behind” by Amanda Watford (June 26, 2026) — [SECONDARY]
[3] Council on Criminal Justice — “An AI Taxonomy for Criminal Justice” (RAND, May 2026) — [SECONDARY]
[4] Barricade AI — “AI Police Report Laws by State: 2026 Tracker” (July 29, 2026) — [SECONDARY] (advocacy organization — Barricade AI builds AI products for law enforcement and discloses a commercial interest)
[5] Brookings Institution — “States can—and should—regulate AI in criminal justice” by Chiraag Bains, Alex Chohlas-Wood, and Katie Kinsey (April 16, 2026) — [SECONDARY]
[6] Virginia Law — “Code of Virginia § 15.2-1723.2. Facial recognition technology; approval” (Effective July 1, 2026) — [PRIMARY]
AI automated and generated content. Human reviewed.
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