Tag: wrongful arrest

  • The Hundred Percent Problem: How a Casino’s False Match, 168 Redacted Names, and a 91 Percent Collapse Are Forcing Police to Corroborate Facial Recognition

    The Hundred Percent Problem: How a Casino’s False Match, 168 Redacted Names, and a 91 Percent Collapse Are Forcing Police to Corroborate Facial Recognition

    Courts, not legislatures, are writing America’s operating rules for police facial recognition. In Reno, a “100 percent match” cost a UPS driver eleven hours in custody and pulled an entire city into federal court. In Detroit, one settlement cut police facial recognition use by 91 percent. The through-line is a single broken assumption: treating a probabilistic similarity score as a positive identification.


    A 100 Percent Match, Eleven Hours in Custody

    On September 17, 2023, the Peppermill Casino in Reno telephoned the police to report that a trespasser had unlawfully returned to the property. The casino’s AI facial recognition software, security officers told responding Officer R. Jager, had provided a “100 percent match” confirming that the man in their security office was M.E. — a patron banned months earlier for sleeping on the premises [1].

    The software was wrong. The man was Jason Killinger, a UPS driver of nearly twenty years, and the identification he was carrying said so in nine places: a Nevada Real ID driver’s license, a Peppermill player’s card, a vehicle registration and insurance card, a Teamsters Local 533 union card, a Department of Transportation medical card, a debit card, and a pay stub — all in his own name [1]. According to the federal complaint, Jager declined to look at any of it, told his supervisor he suspected Killinger had a “hookup” at the DMV manufacturing false IDs, and arrested him so that jail fingerprinting could settle the question [1]. The two men also differed in height and build — the banned patron stood five-foot-nine and 235 pounds against Killinger’s six-foot-one and 200 — a physical mismatch Killinger’s lawyers say should have been obvious on inspection [2].

    Fingerprints at the Washoe County jail confirmed within hours that the man in custody was Jason Killinger and had never been banned from anything. He had nonetheless spent roughly eleven hours in custody, complained of handcuff pain twenty times on body-camera audio, and later received medical treatment for a shoulder injury, the complaint alleges [1], [2]. Prosecutors then pursued a trespass charge under the name “John Doe” anyway, and after a judge dismissed the case the city attorney left the door open to a future identity-theft charge, even offering — and then declining — a referral to a fraud detective [5].


    No Policy, No Training, No Immunity

    Killinger sued in July 2025. In March 2026, U.S. District Judge Miranda Du allowed the case to clear its most consequential procedural hurdle: the City of Reno itself was added as a defendant, exposing the municipality to financial liability [3]. The individual officer kept his qualified immunity for the arrest itself, but the judge drew the line that matters for every police department watching the case. “A municipality is not entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity,” she wrote [3]. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services doctrine, a city answers for its own policies and customs — and that is precisely what the litigation went looking for.

    What it found is the heart of the case. At his January 22, 2026 deposition, Jager took full responsibility for the wrongful arrest, testifying that it never should have happened — an arrest based on AI facial recognition software, he acknowledged, required corroboration and there was none in Killinger’s case [4]. City attorneys’ own filings described the casino’s software — whose vendor has never been publicly named — as so reliable that Reno officers would request Peppermill’s help identifying suspects with it [4]. And as of April 2, 2026, the amended complaint alleges, the Reno Police Department still had no policy on facial recognition and required no training that a match alone does not establish probable cause [5].

    “Jager’s conduct was not a sporadic incident involving the wrongful actions of a rogue employee, but the result of a widespread custom and practice involving hundreds of municipal employees making thousands of arrests in the same manner over a period of years.” — amended complaint, Killinger v. City of Reno [5]

    The legal core logic here is worth stating plainly. A single officer’s mistake dies with qualified immunity. A custom — a practice so routine that it functions as policy — transfers liability to the city’s treasury. That is why Killinger’s attorney, Terri Keyser-Cooper, called the failure to train officers “when such arrests were being made on a regular basis” outrageous [4]: the allegation is not that Reno employed one careless rookie, but that Reno ran an assembly line on which this arrest was one unremarkable stop.


    The 168 Redacted Names

    If the case becomes a precedent, it will be because of a discovery fight now before Judge Du. In April 2026, Killinger’s lawyers asked for the arrest records of 168 people who were cited or transported to the Reno Police Department following facial recognition identifications at the Peppermill [6]. The city produced more than 1,000 pages of records — with every name and personal identifier redacted, and without first seeking a protective order from the court [6].

    The stakes of the dispute are asymmetrical. Killinger’s side argues the 168 are percipient witnesses whose experiences could establish a pattern of facial-recognition-based arrests, and relevant to the injunctive relief and potential class claims he is pursuing [6]. The city counters that the individuals’ privacy is at stake, that the casino provided only dates, times, and initials, and that only 16 of the 168 arrests occurred before Killinger’s — meaning later arrests cannot show the city had notice of a problem at the time of his [6].

    The deeper significance is scale. Wrongful-arrest litigation has so far proceeded case by case: one plaintiff, one arrest, one settlement. The 168 records would turn one case into a census of a single biometric system’s role in a single city’s arrests — an accounting no American police department has published anywhere. If the names are unsealed, both sides will finally be counting the same thing: how many detentions rested on nothing but the match.


    Detroit’s Counterweight: What One Settlement Bought

    Detroit is the controlled experiment in what happens when a department is forced to change. Robert Williams was arrested in his driveway in front of his family in January 2020 after the department’s system flagged his driver’s license photo in a shoplifting case; his June 2024 settlement, negotiated by the ACLU and the University of Michigan Civil Rights Litigation Initiative, produced what civil rights advocates describe as the strongest police facial recognition policy in the United States [7].

    The settlement’s terms all target the same failure:

    • No arrest on a match alone. Officers are prohibited from making arrests based solely on facial recognition results — the exact conduct Reno’s deposition testimony admitted to [7].
    • No algorithm-derived lineups without corroboration. A photo lineup generated directly from a facial recognition search requires independent evidence linking the identified person to the crime, cutting off the practice of laundering a match through an eyewitness [7].
    • Mandatory training on documented error rates, including the technology’s higher misidentification rates for people of color [7].
    • A retrospective audit of every case since 2017 in which facial recognition was used to obtain an arrest warrant [7].

    The numbers that followed are the clearest natural experiment in American policing on this question. Detroit ran roughly 100 facial recognition searches in 2023, 28 in 2024, and nine in 2025 — a 91 percent decline — and of those nine searches, only one produced an actionable investigative lead [7]. The core logic: when a match can no longer substitute for evidence, officers stop requesting matches. Use did not collapse because the technology got worse; it collapsed toward the cases where the tool could actually carry weight — violent-crime investigations with other evidence to corroborate the lead. A rule that sounds like a procedural nicety turned out to be a volume dial.


    Bloomington: The Reform Template Travels

    On August 18, 2026, a second city signed on to the same approach. Bloomington, Minnesota settled the lawsuit brought by Kylese Perryman, who was arrested in September 2021 after investigators compared surveillance photos of a robbery and carjacking suspect against his booking photo [8]. Perryman was verifiably elsewhere, and his height, weight, and visible tattoos distinguished him from the suspect — yet he spent five days in jail and thirty days on electronic home monitoring, missing two funerals and time with his young family [8]. The suit alleged police never ran a lineup, never contacted eyewitnesses, ignored his alibi, and kept the charges alive even after his attorney produced clear evidence of innocence [8].

    “Bloomington police arrested and jailed an innocent man for days, forcing Perryman to prove his innocence before getting the charges against him dropped,” said Teresa Nelson, ACLU-MN legal director [8]. Perryman himself put it more simply: “I brought this lawsuit because nobody should go through the ordeal that I went through” [8].

    The settlement’s policy changes look small and technical, which is the point. Bloomington agreed to adopt a procedure incorporating the KOPS Alerts guidelines from the state’s criminal justice information system operating manual, and to adopt a procedure stating that officers are prohibited from issuing KOPS Alerts as arrest warrants [8]. A KOPS Alert is an investigative lead broadcast to other agencies — a signal to look further, not a finding of identity. Codifying the distinction between a lead and a warrant moves the line from officer judgment into written procedure, where a violation is no longer a bad guess but a rule breach. The city also paid monetary damages [9], [8].


    Fourteen Arrests, One Broken Assumption

    The pattern behind all three cases is now documented nationally. In April 2026, the ACLU counted 14 publicly documented wrongful arrests caused by police reliance on facial recognition, spanning February 2019 through August 2025, and called for binding restrictions rather than voluntary department guidelines [10]. Nearly every person wrongfully arrested has been Black, though Killinger is white — a fact his own complaint uses to argue the problem is systemic rather than demographic [4]. The demographic skew tracks the technology’s documented error structure: NIST testing of facial recognition algorithms found false-positive rates highest for East and West African and East Asian faces, “with a factor of 100 more false positives between countries” [12].

    The true number is unknowable for a reason that is itself a policy failure. Police departments routinely do not disclose when facial recognition drove an arrest — in at least one documented case, the arrest warrant listed the identification source simply as “a credible source,” with no mention of the software that produced the match [11]. Fourteen is the count of cases that became public through court filings, press coverage, or lawsuits; cases settled quietly, pled out, or never attributed to the technology do not appear in it [10].

    And the problem is scaling up faster than the rules. Law professor Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, author of Your Data Will Be Used Against You, warns that agentic AI is about to invert the investigative process itself: “All that data is going to be dumped into an AI model, and they’re going to query it to say who’s the most likely suspect,” he told Stateline, “and then police and prosecutors have to kind of work backwards to see if it’s accurate” [13]. That flips the traditional sequence — evidence first, suspect second — into its mirror image, and it makes the corroboration question more urgent, not less [13].


    The Regulator’s Ledger: Britain’s 107 Recommendations

    While American rules emerge case by case, Britain’s data regulator is attempting to build the governance layer in advance. Between June 2025 and March 2026, the Information Commissioner’s Office audited five police forces across England and Wales, publishing its findings on August 18, 2026 with 107 recommendations covering compliance and best practice — every one accepted or partially accepted [14]. LexisNexis counts 16 of those as urgent and 54 as high priority, spanning governance, lawful basis, data protection impact assessments, data minimisation, security, accuracy and bias, and information rights [15].

    The audits found forces generally documented a lawful basis for processing biometric data, with compliance notably stronger for live deployments than for retrospective image searches [14]. The urgent items read like a checklist of everything Reno lacked: clear senior oversight, accountability and training for staff, records of what personal information is used and where it comes from, controls over image sourcing and retention, and verification that systems are accurate with steps taken to reduce bias [14]. A sixth audit, of the Metropolitan Police, is scheduled for later this year [14].

    The contrast is instructive. The ICO treats facial recognition primarily as a data-governance problem — documentation, retention, oversight — while American reform treats it as a probable-cause problem. Both are attacking the same failure: a match that enters the system as an answer, with no record of what it actually was. A jurisdiction that requires both — documentation of the match and corroboration before arrest — is doing the only thing that has demonstrably worked: refusing to let the score close the case by itself.


    What the Litigation Ledger Means

    Read together, Reno, Detroit, and Bloomington describe a regulatory vacuum being filled by the only institution that cannot decline the case. Congress has passed no federal rules governing police facial recognition; most jurisdictions impose no binding corroboration requirement [10], [13]. Into that vacuum, each lawsuit deposits one enforced rule:

    • Detroit: a match is not an arrest, a lineup, or a warrant — and the department must audit its own past [7].
    • Bloomington: an inter-agency alert is a lead, not an arrest warrant [8].
    • Reno: a city that runs arrests on uncorroborated matches with no policy and no training answers for the pattern in dollars [3], [4].

    The underlying principle is not anti-technology. Detroit still uses facial recognition — nine times last year, once productively — and Bloomington still broadcasts KOPS Alerts. The rule each case enforced is about epistemics, not equipment: a similarity score is a question, and somewhere between the score and the cell, a human being must supply the answer. Departments that skip that step are not using AI as a tool; they are using it as a verdict.

    What to watch

    • Judge Du’s ruling on the 168 names — whether the largest single-city accounting of facial-recognition arrests proceeds [6].
    • The Killinger trial — a November 2025 settlement conference failed, so the custom-and-practice claims against Reno are headed toward trial [1].
    • Detroit’s retrospective audit of every 2017-to-2023 warrant case that rested on a match [7].
    • The Metropolitan Police audit, which will test whether Britain’s governance framework scales to the country’s largest force [14].
    • Any legislature that converts the Detroit standard — no arrest on a match alone — from a settlement term into a statute [10].

    References

    [1] [PRIMARY] Killinger v. Jager, No. 3:25-cv-00388-MMD-CSD, Complaint (U.S. District Court, District of Nevada, filed July 30, 2025). https://thecivilrightslawyer.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/KillingerFederalComplaint.pdf

    [2] [SECONDARY] “Reno Casino AI Misidentification Case Seeks 168 Names.” Hoodline. August 2026. https://hoodline.com/2026/08/reno-man-jailed-11-hours-after-ai-misfire-now-wants-names-of-168-others/

    [3] [SECONDARY] “Lawsuit: Reno police made thousands of unlawful arrests using face ID, suit says.” Reno Gazette Journal. April 7, 2026. https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2026/04/07/facial-id-lawsuit-reno-police-unlawful-arrests/89491408007/

    [4] [SECONDARY] “Judge’s ruling exposes city of Reno to liability in facial ID lawsuit.” Reno Gazette Journal. March 31, 2026. https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2026/03/31/reno-facial-id-lawsuit-rpd/89411008007/

    [5] [SECONDARY] “Lawsuit alleges systemic misuse of facial recognition by Reno police.” Biometric Update. April 2026. https://www.biometricupdate.com/202604/lawsuit-alleges-systemic-misuse-of-facial-recognition-by-reno-police

    [6] [SECONDARY] “Wrongly Arrested Peppermill Guest Demands Identities of 168 Others Flagged by Facial Recognition.” Casino.org. August 2026. https://www.casino.org/news/wrongly-arrested-peppermill-casino-guest-seeks-names-of-168-others-flagged-by-facial-recognition/

    [7] [SECONDARY] Nassar-Smith, Ali. “Detroit Police Facial Recognition Use Drops 91 Percent After Settlement Tightens Policy.” ID Tech Wire. April 27, 2026. https://idtechwire.com/detroit-police-facial-recognition-use-drops-91-percent-after-settlement-tightens-policy

    [8] [ADVOCACY] ACLU of Minnesota. “The City of Bloomington Agrees to Settle Lawsuit After Incorrectly Identifying, Arresting Kylese Perryman.” August 18, 2026. https://www.aclu-mn.org/press-releases/the-city-of-bloomington-agrees-to-settle-lawsuit-after-incorrectly-identifying-arresting-kylese-perryman/

    [9] [SECONDARY] “Bloomington settles lawsuit with man wrongfully arrested due to facial recognition technology.” CBS News Minnesota. August 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/bloomington-lawsuit-man-wrongfully-facial-recognition-technology/

    [10] [SECONDARY] “ACLU Says 14 Wrongful Arrests Now Tied to Police Facial Recognition.” ID Tech Wire. April 20, 2026. https://idtechwire.com/aclu-says-14-wrongful-arrests-now-tied-to-police-facial-recognition

    [11] [SECONDARY] “Flawed Facial Recognition Technology Leads Wrongful Arrest and Historic Settlement.” Quadrangle, University of Michigan Law School. Winter 2024-2025. https://quadrangle.michigan.law.umich.edu/issues/winter-2024-2025/flawed-facial-recognition-technology-leads-wrongful-arrest-and-historic

    [12] [SECONDARY] “Arrested by Algorithm: 13 Cases Dismissed, Nearly Every Victim Black.” State of Surveillance. 2026. https://stateofsurveillance.org/news/facial-recognition-wrongful-arrests-13-dismissals-racial-disparity-2026

    [13] [SECONDARY] “Police use of artificial intelligence grows as rules lag behind.” Stateline. June 26, 2026. https://stateline.org/2026/06/26/police-use-of-artificial-intelligence-grows-as-rules-lag-behind

    [14] [PRIMARY] Information Commissioner’s Office (UK). “Facial recognition in policing: earning public trust through strong data protection governance.” August 2026. http://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/media-centre/news-and-blogs/2026/08/facial-recognition-in-policing

    [15] [SECONDARY] “ICO publishes findings on police use of facial recognition technology.” LexisNexis. August 19, 2026. https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/news/ico-publishes-findings-on-police-use-of-facial-recognition-technology


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  • The Federal AI Governance Gap: FBI Doubles Down While States Build Guardrails

    The Federal AI Governance Gap: FBI Doubles Down While States Build Guardrails

    As the FBI more than doubles its AI use cases, federal risk assessments remain incomplete — leaving states and cities to set the rules.


    The FBI’s AI Buildout

    In 2025, the Department of Justice released its annual AI inventory revealing that the FBI had more than doubled its AI use cases — from 19 in 2024 to 50 in 2025, with 27 categorized as law enforcement. The broader DOJ inventory listed 315 total AI entries with 188 active use cases, a 31 percent increase over the prior year. Law enforcement applications accounted for 62 percent of all deployed use cases.[1][2]

    Among the new deployments are approximately five AI projects for generating investigative leads using suggested facial matches and other biometric data, with four of the five already actively in operation. The FBI’s nine “high-impact” AI use cases include facial recognition, data mapping, biometric matching across large datasets, next-generation location tracking, and automatic vehicle identification.[1][2]

    The core logic of this expansion is straightforward: AI lets investigators search vastly larger datasets — billions of images, cross-referenced databases, real-time location feeds — far faster than any human team could. A single probe image can now generate dozens of candidate matches across jurisdictions in seconds. The promise is efficiency; the risk is that the speed and scale of AI-generated leads can overwhelm the traditional investigative checks that prevent wrongful arrests.

    Missing Risk Assessments

    Despite the rapid deployment, none of the FBI’s high-impact AI use cases have completed the required risk management assessments for issues like bias, safety, and performance. The Trump administration set an April 2026 deadline for all federal agencies to meet minimum risk management requirements for high-impact AI, but as of the inventory’s release, the work remained incomplete.[1][2]

    This matters because “high-impact” designations exist precisely for use cases where errors carry serious consequences — false arrests, misidentification, surveillance of innocent people. Without completed assessments, there is no documented evidence that the FBI has evaluated accuracy disparities across demographic groups, established performance thresholds, or put in place mitigation measures for known failure modes. The inventory itself is described by experts as vague, with tools “bunched together” and labeled generically as “search tool, chatbot, data outlier detection.”[1]

    “There’s a level of ambiguity in how they’ve chosen to describe some of the things in the document itself. It’s extremely difficult to get any kind of definitive sense in terms of how good it is, who’s conducting the oversight or auditing or stress testing.”

    — Patrick Eddingon, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute[1]


    Why Facial Recognition Produces Wrongful Arrests

    The danger of unmanaged AI in policing is not theoretical. At least seven people have been falsely arrested nationwide after facial recognition matches, and in every known case, police failed to conduct sufficient follow-up investigation before making the arrest.[3]

    The most documented case is that of Robert Williams, a Farmington Hills, Michigan resident arrested in January 2020 after facial recognition matched his expired driver’s license photo to surveillance footage of a robbery. Williams was the 9th-best match — not the top result — yet detectives focused on him without checking his alibi, collecting fingerprints, or interviewing witnesses present at the scene. The photo lineup was conducted by a store security employee who had not witnessed the crime. Williams spent over 30 hours in custody, handcuffed in front of his wife and two young daughters, before being released.[4]

    The underlying problem is structural. Facial recognition systems produce ranked lists of possible matches from databases that can contain billions of images. As databases grow, the pool of plausible-looking candidates expands, increasing the odds that an innocent person will appear as a suspect. Researcher Margaret Kovera of John Jay College of Criminal Justice explains that larger databases “up the number of innocent people who are appearing as suspects” while decreasing the ratio of correct identifications.[3]

    This problem is compounded by two factors:

    • Demographic bias: Facial recognition algorithms have historically performed worse on Black, Asian, and Indigenous faces. A 2017 NIST study of 140 algorithms found false positive rates up to 100 times higher for certain demographic groups, driven by training datasets built primarily on white faces and by digital cameras that fail to capture sufficient color contrast for darker-skinned individuals.[4]
    • Automation bias: Investigators exhibit a “hardwired tendency to believe computer outputs are correct, even when warned about errors.” When a system presents a confident-looking match, officers may shortcut the traditional investigative steps — witness interviews, physical evidence, alibi verification — that would catch a false positive.[3]

    As ACLU attorney Nate Wessler puts it, facial recognition is “a technology that is both dangerous when it works and dangerous when it doesn’t work.” When it works, it enables pervasive tracking that threatens constitutional freedoms. When it fails, it produces wrongful arrests of innocent people.[3]


    The Detroit Settlement: A Template for Guardrails

    In the summer of 2024, Williams reached a landmark settlement with the Detroit Police Department — the first in the nation where binding policy changes were negotiated as part of a facial recognition lawsuit. The settlement established what civil rights advocates call the strongest police department policies constraining facial recognition use in the country.[4][5]

    The key provisions include:

    • No arrest based solely on FRT results: Police cannot go directly from a facial recognition match to a warrant or witness identification without independent, reliable evidence linking the suspect to the crime.[4]
    • Lineup restrictions: Photo lineups cannot be based solely on an FRT lead, and the photo used in a lineup must be different from the one the facial recognition system returned.[5]
    • Mandatory training: Officers must receive training on FRT risks, dangers, and higher misidentification rates for people of color before using the technology.[4]
    • Defendant notification: Defendants must be informed when facial recognition was used in their case, including details about the system and process.[5]
    • Retroactive audit: Detroit Police must audit all cases since 2017 in which facial recognition was used to obtain an arrest warrant.[4]

    These measures go significantly beyond the “no sole basis for arrest” rule adopted in seven states. The settlement’s logic is that a blanket prohibition on FRT-only arrests, while necessary, is insufficient — it still permits facial recognition to serve as the overwhelming basis for an arrest, creating confirmation bias downstream. By requiring independent corroboration, restricting lineup procedures, and mandating disclosure to defendants, the settlement addresses the full investigative chain where errors compound.[5]


    States Fill the Federal Vacuum

    While Congress has introduced facial recognition legislation but not passed any, states have been far more proactive. As of the end of 2024, fifteen states have laws limiting police use of facial recognition, up from just one in 2017. These laws span states across the political spectrum, from Montana and Utah to Maryland and Massachusetts.[5]

    The state approaches fall into three tiers of increasing strength:

    • Narrow limits (2 states): New Hampshire and Oregon prohibit facial recognition on body-worn cameras only — the narrowest restriction, addressing the most immediate real-time surveillance concern without limiting broader investigative use.[5]
    • One stronger limit (6 states): Alabama, Illinois, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont each adopted at least one of three key guardrails: a warrant requirement, mandatory defendant notification, or a serious-crime-only restriction. New Jersey’s appellate court ruled in New Jersey v. Arteaga (2023) that defendants must be notified of facial recognition use to protect due process rights under Brady v. Maryland.[5]
    • Multiple stronger limits (7 states): Colorado, Maryland, Maine, Montana, Utah, Virginia, and Washington combine two or more guardrails. Montana became the first state to require a warrant for police facial recognition use (2023), and Utah became the second (2024).[5]

    The warrant requirement is emerging as the foundational policy recommendation. Jake Laperruque of the Center for Democracy and Technology argues it “simultaneously is a strong shield against abuse and should have little disruptive effect on legitimate law enforcement needs” — because the primary legitimate use of facial recognition (identifying an unknown perpetrator from an image of a crime) already provides the probable cause a warrant requires. What a warrant requirement blocks are the nefarious uses: cataloging protester identities, tracking worship attendees, surveilling communities without individualized suspicion.[5]


    New York City Strengthens Oversight

    At the municipal level, New York City passed an expanded POST Act legislative package in April 2025, strengthening oversight of NYPD surveillance technology. The original 2020 Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology Act aimed to bring accountability to NYPD surveillance tools, but Department of Investigation audits revealed persistent compliance gaps, noncompliance, and use of surveillance tools without full public disclosure.[6]

    The expanded package includes three key bills:

    • Intro 168 (Farías): Empowers the DOI to request detailed, itemized lists of all NYPD surveillance technologies, with biannual reporting on technologies acquired or retired, including access and retention policies.[6]
    • Intro 233 (Hudson): Mandates the NYPD publish a publicly accessible facial recognition use policy, with biannual audits of facial recognition use reported to the DOI and posted online.[6]
    • Intro 480 (Won): Expands surveillance Impact and Use Policies to require disclosure of all outside entities receiving NYPD surveillance data, safeguards for each entity, reporting on physical safety risks and disparate impacts on protected communities, and an internal tracking system for intergovernmental data sharing.[6]

    In response, the NYPD revised its Facial Recognition Impact and Use Policy in February 2026 to comply with Local Law 56 of 2025. The revised policy removed the prior claim that facial recognition software “does not use AI/ML” (noting the lack of industry-standard definitions), expanded safeguards around information security and access removal, and clarified that the technology generates “possible match candidates” treated as investigative leads only — not probable cause for arrest.[7]

    The NYPD policy explicitly states that facial recognition results “does not by itself establish a basis for a stop, probable cause to arrest, or to obtain a search warrant,” and requires peer review, supervisor approval, and manual visual comparison of all candidate matches before a possible match report is issued. Notably, the policy prohibits real-time facial recognition on CCTV, drones, and body-worn cameras.[7]


    The Federal-State Divergence

    The contrast between federal and sub-federal governance of AI in law enforcement is stark. The FBI is deploying facial recognition, biometric matching, and location tracking with no completed risk assessments and vague public reporting. Meanwhile, states are enacting warrant requirements, cities are mandating audits and public disclosure, and civil society coalitions of over 40 organizations are calling for outright moratoria on law enforcement face recognition.[1][8]

    The Brennan Center for Justice and its coalition partners argue that “the unfettered use of face recognition technology by law enforcement poses urgent threats to democracy” — because when anyone can be identified at any time, constitutional protections for assembly and association become illusory. Their coalition identifies six core civil rights concerns: exacerbation of policing harms in marginalized communities, privacy threats from persistent tracking, chilling of First Amendment activity, due process violations, non-consensual image use, and racial bias in misidentification.[8]

    DOJ’s own transparency falls behind even other federal agencies. Experts note the DOJ inventory is worse than DHS’s — “a traditionally tight-lipped organization” — with three clearly labeled facial recognition instances all showing 2025 deployment dates despite reports the FBI has used the technology for years. This is the second consecutive year of such reporting shortcomings.[1]

    What Comes Next

    The April 2026 federal risk management deadline will be a critical test. If the FBI and DOJ complete meaningful impact assessments — evaluating bias, establishing accuracy thresholds, and documenting mitigation measures — it would represent a significant step toward parity with state-level guardrails. If the deadline passes with assessments still incomplete or superficial, the federal-state governance gap will widen further, and the real rules governing AI in American policing will continue to be written in state capitals and city halls rather than in Washington.[1][2]

    The trajectory of state and local action suggests the direction of travel. Seven additional states are considering new facial recognition legislation, and the Policing Project has developed a bipartisan legislative checklist recommending transparency standards, officer training, procedural limits, defendant disclosure, vendor documentation, and enforcement mechanisms. The question is whether federal agencies will adopt these same principles voluntarily — or whether Congress will eventually force them to.[3][5]


    References

    [1] FedScoop — “FBI expands AI-powered biometric, facial recognition capabilities, inventory shows” (February 2025)

    [2] FEDagent — “DOJ Expands AI Use for Law Enforcement, FBI Doubles AI Applications in 2025” (February 5, 2025)

    [3] Stateline (Pew) — Gross, Paige. “Facial recognition in policing is getting state-by-state guardrails.” February 4, 2025. https://stateline.org/2025/02/04/facial-recognition-in-policing-is-getting-state-by-state-guardrails/

    [4] University of Michigan Law Quadrangle — Morioka, Sharon. “Flawed Facial Recognition Technology Leads to Wrongful Arrest and Historic Settlement.” Winter 2024-2025. https://quadrangle.michigan.law.umich.edu/issues/winter-2024-2025/flawed-facial-recognition-technology-leads-wrongful-arrest-and-historic

    [5] TechPolicy.Press — Laperruque, Jake. “Status of State Laws on Facial Recognition Surveillance: Continued Progress and Smart Innovations.” January 6, 2025. https://techpolicy.press/status-of-state-laws-on-facial-recognition-surveillance-continued-progress-and-smart-innovations

    [6] NYC Council — “City Council Passes Expanded POST Act Legislative Package to Strengthen Transparency and Oversight of NYPD Surveillance Technology.” April 15, 2025. https://council.nyc.gov/amanda-farias/2025/04/15/city-council-passes-expanded-post-act-legislative-package-to-strengthen-transparency-and-oversight-of-nypd-surveillance-technology/

    [7] NYPD — “Facial Recognition: Impact and Use Policy.” Revised February 4, 2026. https://www.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/post-final/Facial-Recognition-NYPD-Impact-and-Use-Policy-2.4.26-FINAL.pdf

    [8] Brennan Center for Justice — “Coalition Statement Highlights Major Civil Rights Concerns with Face Recognition.” June 3, 2021. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/coalition-statement-highlights-major-civil-rights-concerns-face


    AI automated and generated content. Human reviewed.