The Off-Switch Question: How an April Carve-Out, a Missing RFI, and a Six-Source Exclusive Pushed Bank Supervisors Into the Kill-Switch Business
On April 17 the three federal banking agencies rewrote fifteen years of model-risk guidance and, in a single sentence, wrote generative and agentic AI out of scope. Six months later — with the promised request for information still unpublished — Reuters documented examiners at large and small banks alike asking a much blunter question: how do you turn your AI agents off?
Guidance by Subtraction
On April 17, 2026, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued revised interagency guidance on model risk management, replacing the 2011 guidance that had quietly become the banking system’s de facto AI rulebook.[1] The rewrite rescinds the 2011 “Sound Practices” letter, a 2021 BSA/AML model-risk statement, a Comptroller’s Handbook booklet, and a 1997 credit-scoring bulletin.[1] For fifteen years, supervisors stretched that 2011 letter to cover everything statistical that moved; the revision is deliberately narrower, built on a “risk-based approach” tailored to each organization’s profile, and — critically — the agencies state that it “does not set forth enforceable standards or prescriptive requirements,” so non-compliance will not itself draw supervisory criticism.[1]
The pivotal sentence arrives early and reads: “Generative AI and agentic AI models are novel and rapidly evolving. As such, they are not within the scope of this guidance.”[1] The Federal Reserve’s companion letter, SR 26-2, confirms the guidance is aimed at banking organizations with over $30 billion in assets, and that banks can expect “other risk-management and governance practices to support adoption of generative and agentic AI.”[2] Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle Bowman explained the logic in a May 1 speech: over time supervisors “expanded the scope of the previous guidance beyond its original purpose to apply it in unintended ways,” and the agencies “recognize that rapidly evolving and novel technologies like AI may require a different approach.”[3]
The carve-out is not a deregulatory free pass. The agencies promised to issue “in the near future a request for information that addresses model risk management generally and considers, in particular, banks’ use of AI, including generative AI and agentic AI and AI-based models.”[1] As of mid-October, that RFI has not been published. That gap — a formal supervisory hole where a rule used to be — is where the story of the next six months happens.
The Examination Shifts From Models to Agents
On October 13, Reuters reported, citing six people familiar with the matter, that the Fed, OCC, and FDIC are “stepping up efforts to contain growing AI risks,” with some officials pointing to “the potential for cyberattacks on banks or rogue agents undermining global financial stability.”[4] The inquiries — written and verbal, directed at large, mid-size, and smaller banks — center on how banks use agentic AI, especially in cybersecurity, and whether agents are being used to identify, prioritize, and respond to threats.[4]
According to the report, the questions focus on the following:
- Limits and authority. What limits are placed on agentic systems, how are their actions monitored and approved, and what safeguards prevent an agent from exceeding its authority?[4] The core logic here is that bank failures historically come not from bad models but from authority misallocation — systems or people empowered to act beyond what their controls can contain. An agent that can act is, in supervisory terms, a new kind of authority holder, and the agencies are mapping it the way they once mapped a bank’s authority matrix.
- Audit and traceability. Whether banks can clearly track and audit AI-agent decisions, and whether humans remain involved in key decisions.[4] Decades of model-risk practice assumed a trained validator could re-derive a model’s output; an agent that chains across systems breaks that assumption, so the examiner’s question becomes whether the decision record itself is reconstructable after the fact.
- Shut-down capability. How banks can shut down autonomous systems.[4] This is the off-switch question — the same “kill switch” language supervisors used in examinations reported in June.[5] A control that cannot be exercised during an incident is, in supervisory terms, not a control; regulators are effectively asking banks to prove their breakers work before the storm.
- Foreign-model exposure. Whether banks deploy Chinese-developed technology and other foreign-developed models.[4] This follows a month in which US cybersecurity company CrowdStrike said a person in China likely used a Chinese-developed AI agent together with Anthropic’s Claude Code in a hack on South Korean banks, and OpenAI-developed rogue agents were involved in a breach of AI platform Hugging Face.[4] The supervisory logic: if the model itself is an attack surface and a supply-chain dependency, provenance becomes a safety-and-soundness question, not a procurement preference.
The agencies declined to comment, and the sources told Reuters that regulators “are still gathering information and are not yet being prescriptive about what lenders should be doing.”[4] That is consistent with the June reporting on routine examinations, when supervisors leaned on existing frameworks — model risk management, third-party oversight, consumer-protection law — rather than issuing new AI-specific rules.[5] The result is a supervisory posture that is aggressive in its questions and deliberately light in its formal requirements: no new rule, no published RFI, and examination pressure that never appears in the Federal Register.
The backdrop for the escalation is Anthropic’s Mythos, a frontier model that identifies cyber vulnerabilities. Bowman’s May speech noted the model “accelerates the process of detecting cyber vulnerabilities” and that, used maliciously, “it could be deployed to identify and exploit weaknesses.”[3] Reuters reported that Mythos sent US banks rushing to plug cyber holes in May, and that access has been restricted — with euro zone banks currently excluded.[6] Bessent and Powell convened the largest banks in April to discuss the model’s cybersecurity implications.[3] When the capability frontier moves faster than the rulemaking cycle, the source of discipline shifts from guidance documents to examiner questions — and the sources in both Reuters reports flagged exactly that: the technology “is advancing at a pace that far exceeds the traditional cycle of regulatory learning and rulemaking.”[5]
Three Regulators, Three Postures
The Reuters exclusive is, at bottom, a comparative story: the same frontier-AI risk landing on three supervisory systems and producing three different institutional answers. The differences are not cosmetic — they determine whether banks hear about AI risk through a letter with a deadline or through a conversation in an examination.
- United States — examination-driven, prescriptive-free. The Fed, OCC, and FDIC ask pointed questions but issue no new rules; Bowman has publicly favored “a lighter supervisory and regulatory touch” for lower-risk uses while banks rely on existing risk-management frameworks.[7] The core logic is that a formal rule written today would likely be outdated by the time it is finalized, so the agencies keep the pressure in the exam room. The cost of that choice is a six-month hole between rescinding old guidance and promising new answers.
- Euro area — deadline-driven. The European Central Bank took the most prescriptive approach: in July, chief supervisor Claudia Buch gave euro zone banks four months — until October 31 — to submit plans to counter AI-enabled cyber threats, with an explicit emphasis on improved back-up and recovery.[7] Her letter warned that frontier-AI developments carry “potentially profound implications for the confidentiality, integrity and resilience of banks’ information and communication technology (ICT) systems.”[7] The logic is that a hard date forces prioritization in a way an open-ended dialogue does not.
- United Kingdom — collaborative, deliberately non-prescriptive. Bank of England Governor Andrew Bailey called the ECB’s warning “sensible” but said the BoE would take a less prescriptive approach: “It’s not about issuing edicts,” he told reporters. “It’s about getting in a room and saying … how are we going to share our understandings of the vulnerabilities that we find in this system?”[7] Since the October 13 report, Reuters reports that UK supervisors are also encouraging the largest banks to examine so-called bare metal recovery plans — systems entirely independent from a bank’s main technology set-up that can kick in if primary operating systems are compromised — a costly proposition.[4] The bet is that recovery architecture, not rules, is what survives a fast-moving threat.
Beneath the three postures sits a shared recognition, expressed most formally by the European Systemic Risk Board in July: large-scale cyber disruptions “could erode trust in financial institutions and even trigger runs,” making frontier AI a source of “systemic risks to the financial system,” potentially spread through common technology providers and shared software.[7] The International Monetary Fund added its own warning on October 13 against “complacency” in global financial markets, citing the potential for a cyberattack on a critical institution to undermine confidence.[4] When the IMF’s stability watch and the bank supervisors of three jurisdictions converge on the same scenario, the question is no longer whether AI belongs in financial-stability policy — only who writes the checklist.
The Governance Vacuum, Filled From Below
What should banks and policymakers take from a year in which the formal rulebook shrank while the informal one grew? Three threads stand out.
- The RFI is the tell. Everything formal the agencies have promised about AI agents — the request for information announced in April and reaffirmed in the OCC’s bulletin — remains unpublished as of mid-October.[1] When it lands, it will be the first document that formally asks the industry how generative and agentic AI should be supervised at the federal level. Its scope and framing will signal whether the April carve-out was the first step toward tailored AI guidance or a permanent hand-off to examination pressure.
- Voluntary frameworks are the interim rulebook. With the 2011 letter rescinded and no AI-specific guidance in force, the practical interim standard for US financial institutions is the industry-and-government toolkit built under the President’s AI Action Plan: Treasury’s February 19 release of a shared AI Lexicon and the Financial Services AI Risk Management Framework, which adapts the NIST AI Risk Management Framework to financial services’ operational, regulatory, and consumer-protection realities.[8] Treasury framed the pair as a way to help institutions “move faster with AI by reducing uncertainty and supporting consistent, scalable implementation.”[8] The logic is straightforward: where formal rules lag, a shared vocabulary and a lifecycle-based framework let institutions and examiners converge on expectations without waiting for a rulemaking cycle.
- The questions are already the standard. Bowman’s May speech frames the Fed’s philosophy as ensuring bankers are “comfortable discussing emerging risks and new technologies with supervisory teams” while preserving “a path for innovation.”[3] But the October 13 reporting shows the exam-room questions have hardened into a de facto checklist — limits, audit trails, human involvement, off-switches, model provenance — that a bank must answer before any formal rule requires it to.[4] A bank that waits for the published standard will meet it already behind: the questions came first, and they arrived through the examination, not the Federal Register.
References
[1] [PRIMARY] Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. “OCC Bulletin 2026-13: Model Risk Management: Revised Guidance.” April 17, 2026. https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2026/bulletin-2026-13.html
[2] [PRIMARY] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. “SR 26-2: Revised Guidance on Model Risk Management.” April 17, 2026. https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/SR2602.htm
[3] [PRIMARY] Bowman, Michelle W. “Artificial Intelligence in the Financial System.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. May 1, 2026. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bowman20260501a.htm
[4] [SECONDARY] Anand, Nupur, Phoebe Seers, and Tommy Reggiori Wilkes. “Exclusive: Banking watchdogs ramp up AI scrutiny as stability fears mount, sources say.” Reuters. October 13, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/banking-watchdogs-ramp-up-ai-scrutiny-stability-fears-mount-sources-say-2026-10-13/
[5] [SECONDARY] Anand, Nupur. “Exclusive: U.S. bank regulators ramp up scrutiny of AI use at financial companies.” Reuters. June 12, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/us-bank-regulators-ramp-up-scrutiny-ai-use-financial-companies-2026-06-12/
[6] [SECONDARY] “Anthropic’s Mythos sends US banks rushing to plug cyber holes.” Reuters. May 12, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/anthropics-mythos-sends-us-banks-rushing-plug-cyber-holes-2026-05-12/
[7] [SECONDARY] “ECB tells banks to bolster AI cyber defences as peers take lighter approach.” Reuters. July 7, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/ecb-tells-banks-draw-up-plans-against-ai-attacks-amid-disruption-fears-2026-07-07/
[8] [PRIMARY] U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Treasury Releases Two New Resources to Guide AI Use in the Financial Sector.” February 19, 2026. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0401
AI automated and generated content. Human reviewed.
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