Tag: Axon Draft One

  • The Vanishing Draft: How a Product Built to Forget, a Six-Hundred-Thousand-Report Milestone, and Two State Statutes Collided Over Police Accountability

    The Vanishing Draft: How a Product Built to Forget, a Six-Hundred-Thousand-Report Milestone, and Two State Statutes Collided Over Police Accountability

    AI now drafts police reports in roughly 600 departments nationwide — while the leading tool was engineered to leave no record of what it wrote. Two enacted state laws, a wall of prosecutor refusals, and a November wave of study bills are forcing the question the design deferred: who wrote this report?


    The Scale of the Shift

    Axon Enterprise, the company best known for the Taser, says its AI report-writing tools are now in use by 600 police departments across the country and have helped write 600,000 police reports, saving an estimated 300,000 hours according to its customer surveys [1]. Its AI Era product bundle — which includes Draft One, the tool that writes incident narratives from body-camera audio — costs $199 per officer per month, and the company booked approximately $750 million in AI Era contracts in the year after Draft One launched, with first-quarter 2026 revenue from AI products growing more than 700 percent year-over-year [1]. These are no longer pilot programs; they are infrastructure.

    The stakes follow from what a police report is. Officers spend as much as 15 hours a week on reports, and those documents are either stored for reference or handed to prosecutors who decide whether to file charges — making them, as one criminologist put it, a crucial part of the criminal justice system rather than clerical residue [1]. When the drafting of that document moves from an officer’s memory to a language model’s output, the policy question is not whether paperwork gets faster. It is whether the justice system retains the ability to ask, after the fact, what the machine said and what the human changed.


    Two Enacted Laws, Two Philosophies

    Only two states have enacted statutes governing AI-assisted police reports, and they anchor opposite ends of a spectrum: disclosure with full audit infrastructure, versus disclosure with agency self-governance.

    • California SB 524 (Penal Code §13663). Signed October 10, 2025 and effective January 1, 2026, the law requires every law enforcement agency to maintain a policy under which an official report generated fully or partially with AI must, on each page or in the body of the text, identify every specific AI program used and prominently state: “This report was written either fully or in part using artificial intelligence” [2]. The officer must sign the report, verifying they reviewed its contents and that “the facts contained in the official report are true and correct” [2]. The core logic is evidentiary: only the final signed report counts as the officer’s statement, and the first AI-generated draft must be retained for as long as the final report — so that a court, a defense attorney, or a records requester can always compare what the machine proposed against what the officer swore to.
    • Utah SB 180 (Law Enforcement Usage of Artificial Intelligence). Effective May 2025, the statute directs each agency to adopt a written policy governing AI use, requires officers to disclose when AI was involved in generating a report, and requires the officer’s certification that the report was reviewed for accuracy [3][4]. Utah’s approach puts the compliance burden on the agency’s own policy process rather than a statutory retention mandate — the state sets the floor of disclosure, and the department writes the procedure.

    California’s statute reaches one step further than Utah’s, and the step is vendor-facing. A contracted vendor “shall not share, sell, or otherwise use information provided by a law enforcement agency to be processed by artificial intelligence” except for the agency’s own purposes or pursuant to a court order, though vendors may access processed data for troubleshooting, bias mitigation, accuracy improvement, or system refinement [2]. An audit trail must identify, at minimum, the person who used the AI and the video and audio footage used to create the report [2]. The law effectively nationalizes, for California agencies, a data-governance standard that no vendor contract had established on its own.


    A Product Built to Forget

    The reason California’s retention mandate matters is that the dominant product was designed without it. An Electronic Frontier Foundation investigation — built on police reports, emails, procurement documents, department policies, and Axon’s own manuals and marketing materials — concluded that Draft One is engineered so that no one, including a police chief or an independent researcher, can meaningfully audit its use [5]. Draft One processes only the audio from body cameras, not the video; the officer edits the generated text and then copies it into the department’s records system, at which point the draft disappears when the browser tab closes [5]. There is no log distinguishing which portions of a final report were written by the machine and which by the officer, except the officer’s own recollection [5].

    EFF, which obtained a recording of an Axon roundtable discussion, quotes the company’s senior principal product manager for generative AI explaining the retention decision in terms that will likely be quoted in courtrooms for years:

    “So we don’t store the original draft and that’s by design and that’s really because the last thing we want to do is create more disclosure headaches for our customers and our attorney’s offices.” [5]

    The consequences surface in public-records responses. The Lafayette, Indiana Police Department — one of Axon’s most promoted Draft One clients — told EFF: “Regarding the attached request, we do not have the ability to create a list of reports created through Draft One. They are not searchable. This request is now closed.” [5] The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, by contrast, requires a disclosure footer in every AI-assisted report and was able to isolate more than 3,000 Draft One reports generated between December 2024 and March 2025 with a simple keyword search [5]. The difference between the two agencies is not the software — it is whether local policy forced a marker into the text. Axon itself tracks which reports used Draft One internally, and provided a Colorado agency custom code to extract the data after a media request revealed the agency could not [5].

    Axon’s stated position is that officers remain in control: the company describes its approach as “officer-in-the-loop,” saying narratives “cannot be submitted without officer review and approval,” and a spokesperson noted that “AI capabilities and Draft One have evolved significantly in the last two years” [1]. EFF’s finding is narrower but harder to answer: even if officers review every draft, the system keeps no record proving they did, and Axon disclosed a bug that let officers bypass the review guardrails on at least three occasions [5]. A safeguard that leaves no trace is a safeguard that cannot be audited — which is precisely the gap SB 524’s first-draft retention requirement was written to close.


    The Accuracy Record

    The retention question would be academic if the drafts were reliably right. Public records obtained by Forbes suggest they are not, and that the editing burden can consume the promised savings. In Lafayette, officers testing Axon’s Form One tool — which fills in names, license plates, and vehicle details from camera audio — reported in emails that the tool struggled to record the right names or car plates even when they were clearly stated in the footage, with one officer writing: “I know it doesn’t save me time and I know it has inaccuracies that I will have to edit,” and another concluding that “Form One dramatically increases the time it takes to finish reports” — a form that took 30 seconds by hand now taking three minutes [1].

    The only data-driven study of the flagship tool points the same direction. Criminologist Ian Adams, a former police officer, studied the Manchester, New Hampshire Police Department’s use of Draft One for a 2024 Journal of Experimental Criminology paper and found no improvement in report completion time: officers without access filed at the same pace because Draft One users spent their time removing irrelevant information, fixing inaccuracies, and adding facts the system missed [1]. Manchester dropped the tool in 2024, the same year Anchorage police stopped using it citing zero time savings — yet about half of Manchester’s officers still believed it had helped, a gap Adams called “a definite gap between the perception and objective reality” [1]. That perception gap is itself a policy problem: if officers systematically overestimate the tool’s reliability, the human review that the whole framework depends on weakens precisely where it is hardest to observe.


    The Prosecutor Wall

    The fastest-moving constraint has come not from legislatures but from the officials who decide what evidence they will take to court. The Prosecuting Attorney’s Office in King County, Washington — which includes Seattle — informed law enforcement agencies in 2024 that it would not accept reports written with AI assistance because of hallucinations, and its policy remains in force [1]. Its 2024 memo was explicit:

    “We do not fear advances in technology — but we do have legitimate concerns about some of the products on the market now… For now, our office has made the decision not to accept any police narratives that were produced with the assistance of AI.” [1]

    King County Prosecutor Daniel Clark described the concrete failure modes: AI getting the names of witnesses and officers wrong, or placing officers at a scene when they were only on the radio. “It’s a type of error that can really challenge an officer’s credibility when they’re on the stand, and then that puts the officer at risk of being either called lazy, sloppy or dishonest,” Clark said. “None of those are good options.” [1] The logic cuts across the usual ideological lines: a prosecutor refusing AI-drafted reports is not protecting defendants from police so much as protecting the evidentiary value of police work itself.

    The refusals are stacking up beyond Seattle. Connecticut’s Chief State’s Attorney imposed a statewide, non-statutory moratorium on AI-drafted official reports in April 2026, and county-level prosecutor restrictions are in place in King County, Wayne County, Michigan, and Hays County, Texas [4]. No state has banned the practice by statute — a Nevada ban was stripped from its bill before it died in 2025, and Minnesota’s government-wide prohibition on generative AI in official records lapsed at the May 2026 adjournment [4]. The pattern is a governance inversion: the branch of the system with the least formal rulemaking power is setting the de facto national standard, one charging decision at a time.


    The Vendor Incentive Problem

    Disclosure laws address who wrote the report, but the ACLU has raised a second-order concern: the company that writes the draft may have reasons of its own to shape it. Axon and its rival Motorola Solutions do not merely sell report-writing AI — both sell license plate readers, surveillance cameras, body cameras, drones (in Axon’s case), Tasers, and real-time crime center software, meaning the same vendor’s products may be what the report is about [6]. A report-drafting model, in other words, could be trained or prompted to mention some technologies favorably, or not at all.

    The concern is not hypothetical. EFF found that Vigilant Solutions — the license-plate-reader company later acquired by Motorola — recommended in a training slideshow that officers omit its technology from reports when possible: “If the use of the LPR equipment can be left out of the report, that is what is recommended” [6]. The precedent shows a police-technology vendor actively coaching officers on report content that affected the vendor. California’s vendor-data restrictions and audit trail are the first statutory answer to that conflict of interest; they still do not reach the model itself — what it was fine-tuned to include, omit, or emphasize — which remains invisible to agencies, courts, and the public [6].


    The Next Wave: Study Bills and Deadlines

    The statehouses are now processing what the first two laws started. New Jersey is the most recent test case: two bills — A-759 on facial recognition and A-3076 on AI — would direct the attorney general to study how police use the technologies and recommend statewide policies, with A-3076 calling for a policy requiring officers to review AI-generated reports for accuracy and completeness [7]. Both cleared the Assembly Public Safety and Preparedness Committee on October 19 [7]. Assemblyman Balvir Singh, whose district already has departments using AI report writers without statewide guidance, named the core risk:

    “The concern is that police reports are often central to court proceedings, where specific words, phrasing, and details matter,” Singh said. “Generative AI doesn’t just clean up grammar. It can add supporting details, substitute words, and change phrasing for clarity and flow. These unintended changes, especially when they go unnoticed, can alter the meaning of an officer’s account and potentially affect legal proceedings.” [7]

    State Senator Benjie Wimberly, who is expected to introduce identical bills in the upper chamber, framed the choice in fewer words: “We shouldn’t have to wait for something to go wrong before establishing appropriate safeguards. Public safety and civil liberties are not mutually exclusive. We have an obligation to protect both.” [7] Skeptics argue studies are the slower of two paths — Montclair State justice studies professor Jason Williams would prefer accountability measures, use restrictions, and independent audits now, warning that “Officer review is necessary… but it may not be sufficient because sometimes people have this tendency to just rely on the AI output” [7].

    Elsewhere the calendar is doing the work:

    • New York. S10425/A9253-A would have required 90 days’ public notice before deploying a covered AI product and disclosure to the defense within 20 days of any post-arrest AI use; it stalled in committee and dies with the 2025–26 term in January 2027 unless reintroduced [4]. Its defense-disclosure clock is the most defendant-facing provision any legislature has drafted.
    • Virginia. HB 1294, requiring disclosure, first-draft retention, and an audit trail, was carried over to the 2027 session [4] — the closest pending analogue to California’s regime.
    • Connecticut, Michigan, Washington. Prosecutor-level restrictions remain the operative rule where legislatures have not acted, a reminder that the current national baseline is a patchwork of charging policies rather than law [4].

    What to Watch

    • The first enforcement test of SB 524. California’s first-draft retention requirement took effect January 1, 2026, and EFF’s finding is that Draft One “cannot comply” with it as designed [5]. Whether Axon ships a retention feature for California agencies — and whether any department without it continues using the tool — is the first real compliance question.
    • Disclosure in the courtroom. California requires the disclosure statement to be “readily apparent to the reader” on every page [2]. The first appellate fight over whether an AI-assisted report was properly disclosed to a jury will define how far the statute reaches in practice.
    • Whether prosecutors codify their refusals. The King County and Connecticut policies are internal decisions, reversible at will [4]. If a legislature converts any of them into statute, the de facto standard becomes binding.
    • The vendor audit trail. Axon tracks Draft One report usage internally that its customer agencies cannot extract [5]. Whether California’s audit-trail requirement forces that data into agency hands is an open implementation question — and a test of whether disclosure law can outrun product design.
    • New Jersey’s study reports. If A-3076-style provisions advance, the attorney general’s recommended statewide policy — particularly its officer-review requirement — would give the study-bill approach its first output [7].

    The collision at the center of this story is simple to state. A product that writes the foundational document of criminal prosecution was designed, in its vendor’s own words, to avoid “disclosure headaches” — and two state legislatures have now answered that design with a disclosure mandate. The question the next year will settle is whether the record of what the machine wrote becomes something the justice system can see, or whether six hundred thousand reports join the system with no one able to say which words were the officer’s.


    References

    [1] Forbes — [SECONDARY] Brewster, Thomas. “Axon Says AI Police Reports Save Time. Public Records Show They Get Facts Wrong.” July 22, 2026.

    [2] California Legislative Information — [PRIMARY] SB 524 (Arreguín), Chapter 587, Penal Code §13663. Approved October 10, 2025; effective January 1, 2026.

    [3] Utah State Legislature — [PRIMARY] SB 180, “Law Enforcement Usage of Artificial Intelligence.” 2025 General Session; effective May 2025.

    [4] Barricade AI — [SECONDARY] “AI Police Report Laws by State: 2026 Tracker.” Updated November 2026. (vendor-maintained research tracker)

    [5] Electronic Frontier Foundation — [ADVOCACY] Guariglia, Matthew, and Dave Maass. “Axon’s Draft One Is Designed to Defy Transparency.” July 10, 2025. (digital rights organization)

    [6] American Civil Liberties Union — [ADVOCACY] Stanley, Jay. “Another Problem With AI-Assisted Police Reports: Companies Can Have Incentives to Distort Their Content.” August 28, 2026. (civil liberties organization)

    [7] The Jersey Vindicator — [SECONDARY] Janoski, Steve. “NJ lawmakers want safeguards for police use of AI, facial recognition software.” November 2, 2026.


    AI automated and generated content. Human reviewed.


    Listen to the Podcast: AI Policy for the Bears

    Episode 45: The Vanishing Draft: How a Product Built to Forget, a Six-Hundred-Thousand-Report Milestone, and Two State Statutes Collided Over Police Accountability — click to listen

    Two bears break down this story on AI Policy for the Bears, Episode 45.

  • The Unfinished Draft: What One Year Under America’s Only Two AI Police-Report Laws Revealed

    The Unfinished Draft: What One Year Under America’s Only Two AI Police-Report Laws Revealed

    Utah and California enacted the nation’s first statutes governing AI-written police reports. Twelve months later, the bills that would have followed them lapsed or died in four legislatures, prosecutors quietly became the field’s real regulators, and the machine’s first draft — the document both laws were built to preserve — remains the system’s missing evidence.


    Two Statutes, Two Theories of the Problem

    Police reports look like paperwork, but they are the narrative the rest of the criminal process inherits: they shape charging decisions, plea negotiations, sentencing, civil liability, and a defendant’s ability to challenge the case.[1] Since 2024, vendors led by Axon’s Draft One have sold tools that generate draft report narratives directly from body-worn camera audio, and as of October 2026 exactly two states have enacted statutes governing the practice — with no binding federal law on the books.[2]

    Utah moved first, with a disclosure theory. SB 180, signed March 25, 2025 and effective May 7, 2025, requires every law enforcement agency to adopt a written generative-AI policy — spelling out which tools employees may use, which tasks they are permitted for, the importance of reviewing AI content, and the acknowledgment that violations can bring administrative discipline. Any report or record created wholly or partly with generative AI must carry a disclaimer, and the author must certify they read and reviewed it for accuracy.[3] The logic is that sunlight is the cheapest, fastest intervention: force the agency to admit on the face of the document that a machine wrote part of it, and judges, defenders, and juries can weigh it accordingly. What Utah does not require is keeping the AI draft, which means no one can later compare what the machine produced against what the officer signed.

    California moved second, with an evidence theory. SB 524, signed in October 2025 and effective January 1, 2026, added Penal Code section 13663. When a report is generated fully or partly by AI, the agency’s policy must ensure:[4]

    • Page-level disclosure. Every AI program used must be identified in a manner “readily apparent to the reader,” alongside the sentence: “This report was written either fully or in part using artificial intelligence.”[4]
    • Officer certification. The preparing officer signs, physically or electronically, verifying they reviewed the report and that the facts are true and correct.[4]
    • First-draft retention. The initial AI draft is retained for as long as the final report — the provision that matters most, because it creates a before-and-after record of human editing.
    • A legal firewall on authorship. Except for the final report, no AI draft “shall not constitute an officer’s statement” — only the signed final version counts, closing the loophole where an officer blames the machine for inaccuracies.[4]
    • An audit trail identifying who used the AI and what video or audio footage the draft was built from.[4]
    • A vendor data ban. Contractors may not share, sell, or reuse agency information except for the agency’s own purposes or pursuant to court order.[4]

    Author Senator Jesse Arreguín (D-Oakland) framed the stakes in liberty terms at the signing:

    “We’re not going to gamble with personal liberty. AI hallucinations happen at significant rates, and what goes in a police report can influence whether or not the state takes away someone’s freedom.”[5]

    Neither law bans anything. Both assume that officer review can carry the constitutional weight. The year’s evidence tested that assumption from three directions — the research, the legislatures, and the prosecutors.


    The Evidence Arrived After the Signings

    The strongest independent study contradicts the efficiency case that drove adoption. A randomized controlled trial by Adams and colleagues, published in the Journal of Experimental Criminology, found that AI did not significantly improve police report-writing speed.[6] That matters because vendor marketing — Axon claims its tool can cut report-writing time by up to 80 percent — is the primary justification agencies give for adoption, and a follow-up survey titled “A Good College Essay but a Bad Police Report” found the AI output was overall less accurate than narratives written by humans.[7]

    The failure modes are not hypothetical. In Heber City, Utah, a department testing AI report software watched a draft absorb a nearby television playing “The Princess and the Frog” into the official incident narrative — an officer transformed into a frog in the record, caught and corrected only because the error was absurd enough to notice.[7] King County, Washington’s “phantom officer” draft became the second documented case, and both now circulate as the field’s shorthand for what unreviewed output looks like.[1] The uncomfortable lesson is that the errors easy to catch are the ridiculous ones; a plausible-sounding hallucination — a wrong sequence of events, an inferred intent — is precisely the kind a tired officer reviewing a polished draft will miss.

    The Council on Criminal Justice’s September 2026 case study, applying its AI decision framework to a hypothetical 200-officer department, classified AI report writing as carrying both substantial risk and substantial opportunity — a “careful implementation” rating, not a green light. It flagged automation bias as an acute danger, since officers may treat a polished draft built from body-camera data as an authoritative account, and recommended that agencies require officers to document independent recall before reading the AI draft, to keep the machine’s narrative from reshaping the officer’s memory.[1] King County’s chief deputy prosecutor made the same point from the other direction: while an officer must edit the narrative and attest to its accuracy, “some of the [genAI] errors are so small that they will be missed in review.”[8]


    Legislatures Stalled. Prosecutors Moved.

    The 2026 sessions were supposed to extend the Utah–California precedent. Instead, the pipeline jammed:[2]

    • New York’s S10425/A9253-A — the most ambitious bill anywhere, defining “Covered AI” to expressly include report-writing tools, with a public inventory, disclosure, first-draft retention, and enforcement by both the attorney general and private plaintiffs — lapsed when the Legislature adjourned sine die on June 5, 2026. Reintroduction is expected in 2027.[2]
    • Minnesota’s SF 4575/HF 4536, which would have prohibited generative AI in official records including police reports outright, died without a hearing at the May 2026 adjournment. Nevada’s SB 199 ban failed in 2025.[2]
    • Utah’s own SB 205, a follow-up that would have required annual policy review, locked AI safeguard settings, and public posting of agency policies, passed the Senate and died in the House in March 2026.[2]
    • Virginia’s HB 1294 was carried over to 2027; New Jersey’s A3076, directing an Attorney General study, remains pending.[2]

    While the legislatures idled, the officials who actually decide what enters a courtroom did not:

    • Connecticut’s Chief State’s Attorney imposed a statewide moratorium on using AI to draft or narrate criminal reports in April 2026 — the broadest restriction in the country, and notably not a statute at all.[2]
    • King County, Washington has refused AI-assisted narratives since a September 2024 memo: “For now, our office has made the decision not to accept any police narratives that were produced with the assistance of AI.”[8]
    • Wayne County, Michigan Prosecutor Kym Worthy wrote to every police chief in the county in September 2026 urging “cautious and restrained” use of AI-generated reports and announced a countywide policy; Hays County, Texas commissioners voted down funding for Axon’s AI tools after a sheriff’s office trial, with the Kyle Police Department declining to use them at the district attorney’s request.[2]

    The core logic here is leverage, not ideology. A department can buy any tool it wants, but if the prosecuting attorney will not file charges on an AI-assisted report, the product has no practical value in that jurisdiction. Prosecutors move by memo, need no supermajority, and answer to no vendor lobby — which is why the real regulatory map of AI police reporting in 2026 is drawn less by statute than by a scatter of county lines and one statewide moratorium.


    The Gap Neither Law Closes

    Beneath the disclosure and retention rules sits a problem both statutes left untouched: the system prompt — the vendor’s hidden instructions that shape every narrative the model produces. The Council on Criminal Justice concluded that prompt opacity creates “a structural accountability gap that is not fully addressed by CA SB 524 or Utah SB 180,” because the prompt materially shapes the report but is not retained, versioned, or produced in discovery.[1] Its recommendation was unusually blunt:

    “Vendor refusal to retain and produce prompts in discovery should be treated as a Generally Avoid trigger, not a negotiating posture.”[1]

    The doctrinal stakes are Brady and the Sixth Amendment. Existing discovery regimes were not designed for an evidentiary record with a prompt, a model version, and an editing history between draft and final report, and officers may be unable to testify clearly about which sections were machine-written, which they edited, and what they independently remember — the very distinction cross-examination exists to test.[1] Kate Chatfield of the California Public Defenders Association put the defense view in one line at the SB 524 signing: “Too often, police narratives become the default truth, even when they contain errors or biases.”[5]

    Utah Senator Stephanie Pitcher, the former prosecutor who sponsored the first law, anticipated the whole arc. Of her bill she said, “I felt like it was something that it’s better for us to get ahead of, instead of playing catch-up on” — and getting ahead meant accepting that a disclosure requirement, without the draft and the prompt behind it, only tells the court that AI was involved, not what the AI actually produced.[7]


    What to Watch

    • The New York reintroduction (2027). S10425’s Covered AI framework — public inventory, first-draft retention, dual AG and private enforcement — is the most complete legislative template on the table; whether it survives a second session will define the statute map’s next move.[2]
    • Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 707 on machine-generated evidence, now pending, would give federal courts a reliability test that AI-drafted police reports would have to clear.[2]
    • The first prompt-production fight. When a defense team demands the system prompt and draft history under Brady, the answer will either force vendors to retain what they now discard or expose the prompt gap as a constitutional defect.[1]
    • Prosecutor-policy contagion. Wayne County and Hays County showed that a single prosecutor’s letter can end AI report writing in a jurisdiction overnight. The next metro district attorney to follow Connecticut’s statewide lead will redraw the practical map more than any 2027 bill.[2]
    • Vendor compliance with California. Draft One was built to delete its first drafts. SB 524’s retention mandate forces every vendor operating in California to either rebuild for auditability or drop the market — the first real test of whether an evidence-preservation law can beat a product designed for ephemerality.[4]

    The one-year verdict is not that the laws failed. It is that they bought transparency at the front of the pipeline — a label, a signature, a paper trail — while the harder questions moved downstream: whether the review the laws presume actually catches small errors, whether the prompt that shapes every draft will ever see daylight, and whether prosecutors will keep making policy in the space the legislatures left open.


    References

    [1] [SECONDARY] Council on Criminal Justice. “Assessing AI in Action: A Case Study on Police Use of AI-Generated Report Writing Tools.” September 2026. counciloncj.org

    [2] [SECONDARY] “AI Police Report Laws by State: 2026 Tracker.” Barricade AI (vendor-maintained tracker; the company sells AI tools to law enforcement and discloses its commercial interest). October 1, 2026. barricade.tech

    [3] [PRIMARY] Utah State Legislature. “S.B. 180: Law Enforcement Usage of Artificial Intelligence.” 2025 General Session. Signed March 25, 2025; effective May 7, 2025. le.utah.gov

    [4] [PRIMARY] California Penal Code § 13663 (added by S.B. 524, 2025–2026 Regular Session). “Law enforcement agencies: artificial intelligence.” Effective January 1, 2026. codes.findlaw.com

    [5] [PRIMARY] Office of California Senator Jesse Arreguín. “Governor Signs Bill Requiring Law Enforcement to Disclose Use of AI in Police Reports.” October 13, 2025. sd07.senate.ca.gov

    [6] [SECONDARY] Adams, Ian T., Madison Barter, Kristin McLean, Heidi Boehme, and Ian A. Geary. “No Man’s Hand: Artificial Intelligence Does Not Improve Police Report Writing Speed.” Journal of Experimental Criminology 22 (2024): 137–154. doi.org

    [7] [SECONDARY] Seacrest, Logan (R Street Institute). “The Risky Marriage of AI and Police Reports.” Governing (opinion). July 15, 2026. governing.com

    [8] [ADVOCACY] Guariglia, Matthew. “Prosecutors in Washington State Warn Police: Don’t Use Gen AI to Write Reports.” Electronic Frontier Foundation (digital rights organization). October 17, 2024. eff.org


    AI automated and generated content. Human reviewed.

  • The Residue Problem: How a February Ban, a Dozen Silent Case Files, and a Rules-First SOP Are Reshaping Police AI in Wisconsin

    The Residue Problem: How a February Ban, a Dozen Silent Case Files, and a Rules-First SOP Are Reshaping Police AI in Wisconsin

    Milwaukee banned facial recognition in February, yet prosecutions built on the technology continue — while a generative AI policy written before any use, and a county board’s vote to defund Flock cameras, show police AI governance moving from statutes into directives, discovery practice, and budget amendments.


    A Ban That Arrived After the Practice

    On February 6, 2026, Milwaukee Police Chief Jeffrey Norman issued a department directive banning all Milwaukee Police Department members from using or acquiring facial recognition technology, effective immediately[1]. The announcement came the day after residents packed a Fire and Police Commission meeting and testified for nearly three hours against a proposed agreement with the company Biometrica — a deal that would have provided the department with two “free” software licenses in exchange for millions of images and data from Milwaukeeans[2]. Under the directive, MPD will not consider acquiring the technology again until the department develops a formal policy with the Fire and Police Commission[3].

    What made the hearing combustible was the department’s own April 2025 acknowledgment: for two to three years, MPD had used other agencies’ licenses to obtain facial recognition search results without any written department policy governing the practice — and, according to the ACLU of Wisconsin, without the Fire and Police Commission’s knowledge[1]. The ACLU, which had organized much of the nine-month opposition campaign, called the ban welcome but conditional. “This ban can’t just be lip service or a hollow gesture meant to ease public backlash,” said Advocacy Director Amanda Merkwae. “It must actually mark an end to the use of facial recognition by Milwaukee police” (advocacy organization)[2].

    The episode’s core logic is about sequencing. A technology deployed for years without a policy generates cases, habits, and data before any rule exists to govern them; a ban issued afterward cannot reach backward. That asymmetry — rules that arrive after the practice instead of before it — is now the defining feature of police AI governance in Wisconsin, and the two institutions that just learned it are testing opposite corrections: one inside the courtroom, one inside the rulebook.


    The Cases the Ban Did Not Touch

    Seven months later, the directive has a residue problem. Although MPD halted its use of facial recognition in February, cases in which the technology was used at some point in the investigation are still being prosecuted in Milwaukee County[1]. A department can stop using a tool; it cannot un-use it in cases already charged. The moratorium governs future investigations while the pipeline of existing ones runs on — which is precisely where the technology’s documented error rates, and its disclosure record, still live.

    Milwaukee County District Attorney Kent Lovern said his office treats facial recognition as an investigative lead. “It is not, in and of itself, probable cause,” Lovern said. “It’s not, in and of itself, the sole basis for gaining a search warrant”[1]. Information his office receives about facial recognition use in an investigation, he said, is turned over to the defense as part of the case file[4]. Deputy District Attorney Matthew Torbenson described a 2021 home invasion and sexual assault case in which another law enforcement agency’s facial recognition search returned about five potential suspects from surveillance footage; investigators focused on one person based on additional evidence, including an identification by his former spouse, and all five names were disclosed to the defense. Torbenson argued the error risk would be more concerning “if just facial recognition were being used to directly identify a suspect” — which, he said, “is not at all how we’re using it”[1].

    The defense bar’s account is darker, and it turns on a single question: whether anyone told the defendant. The ACLU of Wisconsin reviewed police reports from more than a dozen cases MPD had identified as examples of facial recognition use. “In many of those cases, there was just no mention of (facial recognition technology) use at all,” Merkwae said. Nobody knows the total number of cases in which MPD used the technology — or, of those, how many produced charges in which the use was disclosed in discovery. “I think that’s still a big unknown,” she said[1]. Chief Deputy District Attorney Jeffrey Altenburg acknowledged that leads developed early in an investigation are sometimes not initially shared with prosecutors, but said that once corroborated by standard investigative techniques, “those details are included in the reports that are provided to our office and turned over to the defendant if they are criminally charged”[1].

    Even when disclosure happens, challenging the result is hard. Connor Romenesko, a forensic science practice coordinator with the Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office, said defense attorneys can obtain the image submitted for a search and some information about the software used, but not what they would need to evaluate the system itself. “The biggest concern I have with these services is that they’re provided by private companies who don’t necessarily provide information about how these systems are trained,” he said — which makes contesting a facial recognition result “extremely difficult”[1]. Public defenders are now trained to spot vague language such as “investigative lead” as a signal that facial recognition may have gone undisclosed[1]. The stakes of that opacity are documented: federal research has found that facial recognition systems can produce higher false-positive rates for some racial and ethnic groups, including Black, Asian, and American Indian people[1].

    The practical lesson: once the acquisition debate is won, the battleground moves to discovery. A ban controls what police may do next; the case file controls what courts will do with what police already did. For defendants charged on pre-ban investigations, the governing document is not the February directive at all — it is whatever the prosecution’s file happens to contain.


    Rules Written Before First Use

    The department’s approach to its next AI technology inverts the facial recognition timeline entirely. In January 2026, MPD released Standard Operating Instruction 682, “Generative Artificial Intelligence” — a detailed governing policy for a technology the department does not currently use[5]. Where facial recognition ran for years with no written rules, the generative AI rules now precede the tool. The contrast is the lesson institutionalized: SOP 682 is what a department writes after discovering what happens when policy comes second.

    The directive, issued January 23, 2026 and approved by Chief Norman, builds its regime on a few load-bearing rules[6]:

    • Draft-only status. AI-generated content “should be considered draft material only and shall be thoroughly reviewed prior to use” — the technology may supplement human work, never substitute for it[6].
    • Disclosure. Members must indicate AI’s contribution in the final work product, so reviewers can distinguish machine-drafted material from human work[6].
    • Human verification before action. “Prior to taking any law enforcement action based on information from an AI system or tool, the information shall be verified by a human person”[6].
    • Data barriers. Unless contractual safeguards exist, members are prohibited from uploading personally identifiable information, criminal justice database information, or HIPAA data into public AI platforms — generic placeholders like “suspect” or “victim” are to be used instead[6].
    • Governance machinery. An AI committee must meet at least bi-annually; audits must test for biased outcomes and ensure training data is “diverse and representative of the Milwaukee population”; an inventory of approved systems is to be made public when appropriate for transparency[6].

    And one prohibition that functions as the policy’s constitutional clause:

    “Members shall not use generative AI systems to rationalize a law enforcement decision, or as the sole basis of research, interpretation, or analysis of the law or facts related to a law enforcement contact or investigation.”[6]

    The immediate use case on the horizon is report writing. Axon, the company that provides MPD’s body cameras, offers a product called Draft One, which generates draft police reports from body-camera audio — and MPD’s Generative Artificial Intelligence Committee has met to evaluate such products, though a department spokesperson said any onboarding “is only in the consideration phase, so have we given it thought? Yes. Are we anywhere close to implementing that (technology)? No”[5].

    Prosecutors and defenders are already war-gaming what AI-drafted reports do to the courtroom record. Chief Deputy District Attorney Altenburg acknowledged generative AI’s risks but said “it can be a helpful tool as long as it’s overseen and regulated by actual humans making actual observations and making sure that what is generated is consistent with what was intended to be.” Deputy District Attorney Torbenson noted that some evidence cannot be generated at all: in a child neglect investigation, what a home looks and smells like, whether there is a bug infestation, whether food is available — “all of that has to come from the impressions of the officers that are on scene”[5]. Merkwae raised the credibility problem: if an officer’s testimony later conflicts with an AI-assisted report, a contradiction that in a human-written report “could land a prosecutor putting a police officer on the Brady list” — the prosecutors’ record of officers with credibility issues — now raises the harder question of whether the error was the machine’s[5]. And Romenesko sketched the failure mode that needs no malice at all: an officer rushed at the end of a shift fails to adequately review an AI-generated report, and a prosecutor uses it to charge someone[5].

    Read together, SOP 682 is less a technology policy than an evidence-integrity document. Every rule — draft-only, disclosure, human verification, the ban on rationalizing decisions — exists to keep a gap from opening between what the machine wrote and what an officer can actually testify to. The policy’s bet is that the courtroom record, not the vendor demo, is where police AI will be judged.


    The Funding Lever: Dane County and the Whack-A-Mole Problem

    Fifty miles west, a different institution pulled a different lever. On April 16, 2026, the Dane County Board of Supervisors approved 2025 RES-403, amending the 2026 county budget to remove $80,000 in funding for the sheriff’s office’s Flock automatic license plate reader subscription and prohibiting further expenditures on the system[7]. The sheriff’s office had granted access to information gathered by its 24 Flock cameras — an AI network that photographs passing cars and tracks their movements — to more than 140 law enforcement agencies, including some in Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New York, and Tennessee[7].

    The board’s reasoning was not that deputies misused the system, but that no one could prove nobody else did. “There are well-documented concerns about how this company operates and uses its technology to violate people’s 4th Amendment rights,” said Board Chair Patrick Miles, adding that the county is “open to considering other companies that have stronger safeguards in place.” Supervisor Chad Kemp, the resolution’s author, put the logic plainly: the sheriff’s office “has not been able to affirmatively confirm that the agencies it shares data with, or Flock itself, are not misusing the information collected by cameras in Dane County. Given what we know about how this technology has been abused elsewhere, the responsible course of action is to end funding for this contract”[7]. The board voted 32-1 in April, and the sheriff confirmed he would comply and stop using Flock when the subscription ran out[8].

    The back story explains why the board’s lever was the budget rather than an ordinance: the sheriff originally installed the system without board approval because it was paid for by a $68,750 grant from Axon Enterprise — the same company whose body cameras and Draft One report-writing product sit in Milwaukee’s technology pipeline[8]. When a surveillance vendor funds the grant, procurement oversight never gets a vote. Dane County’s defunding is the corrective: control the money, control the capability.

    Dane County is one domino in a statewide cascade. The city of Verona pulled its three license plate readers from the Flock network in November 2025 after police officers elsewhere in the country accessed Verona’s cameras on behalf of immigration agents; Flock ignored Verona’s takedown demands for months, and the city eventually covered the cameras with black plastic bags. Monona suspended its use of Flock cameras, and Oshkosh rescinded its contract after its police chief said Flock allegedly misrepresented how its data was used[8].

    But privacy advocates warn that each win substitutes rather than retires the capability. The Dane County sheriff’s office is already exploring other vendors to replace Flock[8], and the board has signaled openness to alternatives with “stronger safeguards”[7]. Jon McCray-Jones, a policy analyst with the ACLU of Wisconsin, calls this the core trap: the conversation has been about “how bad Flock is,” but the underlying issues — similar cameras, similar databases, “similar mass, warrantless tracking” — persist regardless of vendor. “You just have a different logo on the contract,” he said (advocacy organization)[8].

    That is the structural insight Wisconsin’s 2026 skirmishes have produced: the unit of police AI governance is not the technology, and increasingly not even the statute — it is the contract and the budget line. A department directive banned a capability in Milwaukee; a budget amendment defunded one in Dane County; neither, by itself, touches the substitution problem. The capability persists as long as the demand does, which is why activists are now pressing local officials for proactive guardrails on entire categories of AI surveillance rather than company-by-company campaigns[8].


    What to Watch

    • The Fire and Police Commission process. Milwaukee’s facial recognition ban holds only until MPD develops a formal policy with the commission — the moratorium’s conversion into a durable rule, or its quiet expiration into a permanent status quo, is the test[1].
    • Discovery in the residue cases. Whether pre-ban facial recognition leads are disclosed in every active Milwaukee County prosecution is now a case-by-case question — and the total count of affected cases remains, in the ACLU’s words, “a big unknown”[1].
    • The Generative AI Committee’s first product decision. If MPD approves a Draft One-style report writer, the draft-only, disclosure, and human-verification rules meet the pressures of real shifts — and the Brady-list question gets its first test[5].
    • Dane County’s replacement vendor. Whether the sheriff’s next ALPR contract requires board approval, and whether it merely swaps logos, will show whether the county’s new oversight is structural or episodic[7].
    • Wisconsin’s fall elections. Milwaukee officials hoping for state-level surveillance controls are watching the governor’s and Legislature’s races; until the state acts, city councils say they must rely on departments voluntarily restricting their own use[8].

    References

    [1] [SECONDARY] Wisconsin Watch / Milwaukee Neighborhood News Service — “Despite police department ban, facial recognition technology lingers in Milwaukee’s criminal justice system” by Devin Blake (September 13, 2026)

    [2] [ADVOCACY] ACLU of Wisconsin — “ACLU of Wisconsin Calls for Accountability After Milwaukee Police Chief Announces Facial Recognition Moratorium” (February 6, 2026)

    [3] [SECONDARY] Fox6 Now (Milwaukee) — “MPD facial recognition technology banned” (February 6, 2026)

    [4] [SECONDARY] Wisconsin Law Journal — “Milwaukee facial recognition cases raise concerns” by Devin Blake of Milwaukee Neighborhood News Service (September 18, 2026)

    [5] [SECONDARY] Wisconsin Watch / Milwaukee Neighborhood News Service — “Milwaukee Police Department considers use of generative AI” by Devin Blake (September 26, 2026)

    [6] [PRIMARY] Milwaukee Police Department — Standard Operating Instruction 682, “Generative Artificial Intelligence,” issued January 23, 2026 (approved by Chief Jeffrey B. Norman)

    [7] [PRIMARY] Dane County Board of Supervisors — “Dane County Board Votes to Withdraw Funds for Flock License Plate Reader Contract,” Resolution 2025 RES-403 (April 16, 2026)

    [8] [SECONDARY] Bolts / Wisconsin Watch — “Flock loses another Wisconsin contract as AI surveillance backlash spreads” (May 2026)


    AI automated and generated content. Human reviewed.

  • The Prompt Gap: How a ‘Generally Avoid’ Clause, a Stalled Study Bill, and a $30,000-a-Month Cold Case Are Moving Police AI Rules Out of Statutes and Into Contracts

    The Prompt Gap: How a “Generally Avoid” Clause, a Stalled Study Bill, and a $30,000-a-Month Cold Case Are Moving Police AI Rules Out of Statutes and Into Contracts

    California and Utah passed the first disclosure laws for AI-written police reports. A September case study from a national task force says the real decisions are being made somewhere no statute reaches: the procurement contract.


    What the First Disclosure Laws Actually Regulate

    When California Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill 524 on October 10, 2025, California became the first state to require law enforcement to publicly disclose when generative AI helped draft a police report. The law, codified at Penal Code section 13663 and effective January 1, 2026, applies when AI automatically drafts a report narrative from body-worn or vehicle camera recordings or an officer’s dictated report. It requires agencies to maintain a written policy, to identify every AI program used on each page or clearly within the report, to state prominently that “This report was written either fully or in part using artificial intelligence,” and to obtain the signature of the officer or agency member confirming the report was reviewed and its facts are true and correct.[1] Agencies must retain the initial AI draft for as long as they keep the official report, maintain an audit trail identifying who used the AI and what audio or video informed it, and police their vendors’ ability to share, sell, or reuse agency data.[1]

    Utah got there first in a different register. Senate Bill 180, enacted in 2025 and codified at Utah Code section 53-25-902, requires every law enforcement agency in the state to adopt a policy governing employee use of generative AI, and pairs disclosure of AI involvement with an officer’s certification that the final document is accurate.[2] The two laws are the first generation of their kind, and they share a design: both regulate the output — the finished report and what the public is told about it.

    That design choice has a logic behind it. A police report is not an administrative formality; it shapes charging decisions, plea negotiations, sentencing, impeachment at trial, and civil liability. Disclosure regimes make the AI’s role visible to every downstream reader — prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, jury — on the theory that visibility enables challenge. What they cannot do is reach the layer upstream of the report, where the narrative-shaping instructions actually live.


    The Layer the Laws Cannot Reach

    In September 2026, the Council on Criminal Justice’s national Task Force on Artificial Intelligence published a case study walking a hypothetical 200-officer department through whether to adopt AI report-writing tools. Its central finding is that the disclosure laws do not resolve the deepest problem in the stack: the system prompt. The task force notes that Utah’s and California’s statutes “are first-generation legislative responses that require agency policies around AI use and disclosure, but neither fully resolves the prompt issue.”[3]

    The prompt is the instruction set that tells the model what kind of document to produce — what to include, what to summarize, what tone to adopt. It shapes every report the tool generates, yet under current vendor practice it is typically not retained, versioned, or disclosed. The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s investigation of Axon’s Draft One found that the product processes only audio from body cameras, sprinkles the draft with bracketed placeholders for the officer to fill or delete, and deletes the draft when the officer closes the window — meaning the record of what the machine wrote, and what the officer changed, simply vanishes. EFF concluded that “there is no meaningful way to audit Draft One usage, whether you’re a police chief or an independent researcher, because Axon designed it that way.”[4]

    This matters because of what a police report is in court. The Council on Criminal Justice flags unresolved Sixth Amendment concerns — officers may be unable to testify clearly about which sections of a report the AI generated, which they edited, and what they independently remember — and Brady concerns, since the initial draft or the system prompt may contain material information, “particularly if the final report differs from the initial AI-generated version.”[3] A defense attorney who knows AI was involved but cannot see the draft or the prompt cannot test the most consequential question: did the machine’s version of events survive into the report the jury will hear about?

    The case study’s sharpest recommendation is aimed not at legislatures but at the purchasing department:

    “Vendor refusal to retain and produce prompts in discovery should be treated as a Generally Avoid trigger, not a negotiating posture. If the prompt materially shapes the report but cannot be retained, versioned, audited, or produced when legally relevant, then the agency cannot adequately manage the evidentiary and rights-related risks of the system.”[3]

    The underlying logic is leverage. A statehouse cannot compel a private vendor to expose its system prompt, and a disclosure statute regulates the document, not the pipeline that produces it. But a department signing a contract can demand prompt retention, draft retention, model-change notification, and discovery access as terms of sale. The task force accordingly instructs agencies to treat the system prompt, initial AI draft, and final report “as a set, all subject to discovery” — a posture it describes as going “beyond CA SB 524” — with retention aligned to the longest applicable statute of limitations and a requirement that “tools should not erase initial drafts on export.”[3] In other words: where the statute ended, the contract has to begin.


    The Evidence Problem Underneath

    Why does the prompt gap matter so much? Because the empirical record gives reason to doubt the tools do what vendors say they do. The strongest independent evidence cited by the task force is a randomized controlled trial by criminologist Ian T. Adams and colleagues, published in the Journal of Experimental Criminology, which found that AI did not improve police report writing speed — the core selling point — contradicting vendor time-savings claims.[5] A second study asked experienced police supervisors to review 80 reports, 20 of which had been drafted with Draft One. The 92 reviewers could not identify which reports were AI-assisted at better than coin-flip accuracy, and while the AI drafts scored marginally better on surface measures like grammar, they were rated worse on the measure that decides cases: accuracy, at p = .038, moving a report from roughly the 50th to the 36th percentile.[6] As the ACLU summarized the pattern, “there is not a single independent evaluation that supports the vendor claims being made to police departments right now.”[7]

    The failure modes are not hypothetical. In Heber City, Utah, a Draft One report absorbed the audio of a Disney movie playing in the background during a call and produced a report claiming the officer “shape-shifted into a frog.” “The body cam software and the AI report writing software picked up on the movie that was playing in the background, which happened to be ‘The Princess and the Frog,’” Sergeant Keel of the Heber City Police Department told FOX 13. “That’s when we learned the importance of correcting these AI-generated reports.”[8] A comic error is easy to catch; a confident misstatement of a suspect’s words or an officer’s observations is not. That is the animating worry behind the accuracy findings — an AI draft is not more likely to be obviously wrong, it is more likely to be plausibly wrong, in a document whose polished narrative voice reads as authoritative.

    Downstream actors have already reacted. The King County, Washington prosecutor’s office told police in September 2024 not to use AI to draft official reports, citing error concerns — an early signal that prosecutorial acceptance, not legislation, would be the binding constraint.[9] And some departments have found their own simplest compliance path: the San Diego Police Department issued a training order in December 2025 informing all employees that they “shall not use any AI programs” to author reports unless specifically approved, stating that “the Department does not authorize the use of any generative Artificial Intelligence programs to author a police report” — a ban that doubles as its SB 524 policy.[10]


    Where the Rules Are Actually Being Written

    Between the disclosure statutes and the courtroom sits a large, mostly unregulated middle: the state where departments are buying these tools faster than anyone is writing rules for them. New Jersey is the current case in point. Officers in towns from Mount Holly to Eastampton use AI to draft incident reports, but the state has no statewide strategy or regulation for police AI. A bill to study AI in policing has been introduced twice since May 2025 without advancing, and the Attorney General’s office says only that it “is actively pursuing statewide governance to ensure ethical, constitutional, and fair evaluation and implementation of AI by New Jersey law enforcement,” declining to offer a timeline.[11]

    Some chiefs are not waiting, and their hesitation is itself a form of policy. Middle Township Police Chief Tracey Super told the New Jersey Monitor his department tried an AI tool for a cold case — the 1991 disappearance of 11-year-old Mark Himebaugh — under a free yearlong trial with the company Terawe. “It really didn’t do what we were hoping,” he said. “It was more like a search engine with a database, which was helpful, but nothing that we were able to actually solve Mark’s disappearance.” Continuing would have cost $30,000 a month for a 55-officer department serving about 20,000 residents. “We still want to find Mark, but we can’t devote one tenth of our budget to it.”[11] His larger caution is about contracts as governance: “If you sign a two-year contract with a company, and then you’re six months in and the attorney general says you can’t use that? We’re still obligated to pay that contract.”[11]

    That quote names the actual mechanism. When no statute binds the vendor, the contract is the only instrument that does — and the Council on Criminal Justice’s case study functions as a checklist for using it. Among the terms the task force says a department should require before signing:

    • Prompt and draft retention as contract requirements — prompt retention “beyond CA SB 524,” initial-draft retention beyond the statutory minimum, and mandatory notification when the vendor changes the system prompt or migrates the underlying model.[3] The logic: the audit trail the law requires is worthless if the vendor’s software destroys the underlying records by design.
    • A contractually fixed hallucination-rate methodology, with monthly vendor reporting — “frame as ‘validation, not audit of trade secrets’”.[3] The logic: without a fixed definition of error, the vendor’s performance claims cannot be tested, only repeated.
    • Independent third-party validation as a renewal condition, plus a formal alternatives analysis comparing the AI tool against templates, plain dictation, added clerical staff, and workflow redesign.[3] The logic: the question is never “is AI useful” but “is AI better than the cheaper, risk-free alternative” — a question vendors have no incentive to pose.
    • No “approve all” shortcuts — officer review and edits captured at the per-section level, so the record shows exactly what the machine wrote and exactly what the officer changed.[3] The logic: this is the fix for EFF’s core finding, and it can only exist as a product-design demand at signing time.
    • Indemnification for hallucination-driven evidentiary issues, and termination rights for rights concerns — with the case study predicting vendor pushback precisely there.[3] The logic: liability allocation is where the vendor’s confidence in its own accuracy claims gets priced.
    • A minimum six-month pilot with pre-set success criteria — time savings, error rate, officer edit rate, prosecutor acceptance, defense motions, and demographic parity in output language — and a formal go/no-go decision.[3] The logic: because the harms surface months later in courtrooms, a few weeks of department testing proves nothing.

    The task force classifies AI report writing as both substantial risk and substantial opportunity — its framework’s “careful implementation” category — and ties that classification to annual reassessment, with new triggers including prompt changes, model migrations, bias findings, defense motions, and Brady disclosures.[3] It also prescribes an operational safeguard no statute has attempted: where feasible, officers should document their own independent recollection before reading the AI draft, to keep the machine’s narrative from overwriting the officer’s memory.[3]


    What to Watch

    The pattern to track in the coming year is not another disclosure bill — it is whether the contract terms migrate from a task-force report into actual vendor agreements, and whether “Generally Avoid” becomes what “Generally Avoid” is meant to be: a standard a police chief, a city attorney, or eventually a judge can point to. Two developments would signal that it is taking. First, a public records request surfacing an Axon or competitor contract that contains — or conspicuously lacks — the prompt-retention clause. Second, a defense motion built on the gap itself: a demand for the initial draft and system prompt in a case where the final report differs from what the machine wrote. When that motion is granted, the contract era of police AI governance will have begun in earnest; when it is denied, the prompt gap will have survived its first court test.


    References

    [1] California State Legislature — [PRIMARY] S.B. 524, Law enforcement agencies: Artificial Intelligence (Pen. Code § 13663), 2025–2026 Regular Session. Signed October 10, 2025; effective January 1, 2026.

    [2] Utah State Legislature — [PRIMARY] Utah Code § 53-25-902 (S.B. 180, Law Enforcement Usage of Artificial Intelligence), 2025 General Session.

    [3] Council on Criminal Justice, Task Force on Artificial Intelligence — [SECONDARY] “Assessing AI in Action: A Case Study on Police Use of AI-Generated Report Writing Tools.” September 2026.

    [4] Electronic Frontier Foundation — [ADVOCACY] Guariglia, Matthew, and Dave Maass. “Axon’s Draft One Is Designed to Defy Transparency.” July 10, 2025.

    [5] Adams, Ian T., Barter, M., McLean, K., Boehme, H., and Geary, I. A. — [SECONDARY] “No Man’s Hand: Artificial Intelligence Does Not Improve Police Report Writing Speed.” Journal of Experimental Criminology 22, 137–154. 2024.

    [6] Criminology working paper (crimRxiv) — [SECONDARY] Expert-blind review study of AI-assisted police report quality (80 reports, 20 AI-drafted, 92 reviewers), 2026.

    [7] American Civil Liberties Union — [ADVOCACY] Stanley, Jay. “Studies Question Value of AI-Assisted Police Reports.” May 19, 2026.

    [8] FOX 13 Salt Lake City — [SECONDARY] Constantino, Mya. “Ribbit Ribbit! Artificial Intelligence Programs Used by Heber City Police Claim Officer Turned Into a Frog.” December 19, 2025.

    [9] KOMO News — [SECONDARY] Harris, J. “AI-Assisted Police Reports Not Welcome in King County Due to Potential Errors.” September 2024.

    [10] CBS 8 San Diego — [SECONDARY] “San Diego Police Ban Generative AI in Reports as New State Law Takes Effect.” Training order issued December 2025.

    [11] New Jersey Monitor — [SECONDARY] DiFilippo, Dana. “As Police Increasingly Embrace AI, Some Wait for Regulations and Proof It Works.” September 17, 2026.


    AI automated and generated content. Human reviewed.